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A GLOBAL PARADIGM SHATTERED: THE
JURISDICTIONAL NIHILISM OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S ABDUCTION DECISION IN
ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
Andrew L. Strauss*

We have entered into a new historical era with the end of the Cold War
and the rise of the global economy. No longer locked into a mortal struggle
in the furtherance of what were perceived to be life's most fundamental values and even societal survival, there is now an unprecedented opportunity to
build a global system of government founded on the same civilizing precepts
of legal authority upon which we in the United States have based our domestic order. The potential, if the political will can be summoned, is the creation
of a world structure where conflict over principles, as well as competition for
power, can be resolved peaceably through the media of negotiation, compromise, and adjudication based on legal norms, rather than through violence
and destruction.
The current globalization of the world economy provides new, compelling reasons for strengthening the international legal order in general, and it
particularly gives us new incentive to protect and even enhance the specific
body of international law that defines the boundaries of state jurisdictional
authority. The historic international trade in goods and services is being
eclipsed by the internationalization of the production process itse1f.l This
creates a new imperative that such globalized activity be effectively regulated. To meet this need, national regulatory authority must be defined as
clearly as possible by a framework that delineates the boundaries of state
jurisdiction. Not to meet this challenge is to invite regulatory confusion,
political conflict, and economic inefficiency.
The tragedy of United States v. A l v a r e z - M a ~ h a i n ,the
~ United States
Supreme Court's first post-Cold War international decision, is that the Court

* Associate Professor, Widener University School of Law; B.A., Woodrow Wilson School,
Princeton University; J.D., New York University School of Law. I would like to express my
warm appreciation for the great dedication given to this project by my research assistants,
Heather Satterfield and Bob Lohr. I would also like to thank Alan Garfield, Mary Kate Kearney, Patrick Kelly, Marty Kotler, Mary Brigid McManamon, Laura Ray, and Anne-Marie
Slaughter for their very helpful comments and criticisms.
1. See generally JOSEPHA. CAMILLERI
& JIM FALK,THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?
THE
POLITICS
OF A SHRINKING
A N D FRAGMENTING
WORLDpassim (1992) (discussing the political
PREPARING
OURimplications of global production); ROBERTREICH,THE WORKOF NATIONS:
SELVES FOR 21s~-CENTURY
CAPITALISM
passim (1991) (presenting anecdotal and statistical evidence of the internationalization of the production process).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
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squandered this great historic moment by refusing, for the first time, to uphold the international law which provides for the coherent allocation of international jurisdictional authority over criminal defendants. The Court's
decision dramatically undermined the advancement of international law generally, and the preservation of a coherent allocation of state regulatory authority in the increasingly globalized area of enforcing laws that prohibit
criminal conduct. This article reveals the unfortunate truth that the Supreme
Court in Alvarez-Machain shattered the existing international jurisdictional
~ a r a d i g mand
, ~ in its place offered not a coherent regulatory alternative, but
jurisdictional nihilism. If adopted by other countries, the Court's approach
can only lead to global regulatory confusion.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist overturned the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit4 by ruling that the
United States could assert personal jurisdiction over Humberto AlvarezM a ~ h a i n .Alvarez-Machain
~
was a Mexican doctor who was abducted from
3. As used in this article, the word "paradigm" refers to a generally accepted model that
describes a social institution. Thomas Kuhn very much affected our contemporary understanding of the word. H e employed it t o denote a generally accepted conceptual framework that
explains natural phenomena. The word has been increasingly used, however, by social scientists
E SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS
to explain human institutions. THOMAS
S. KUHN,T m S T R U ~ ROF
43-51 (1962).
4. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was indicted and brought before the United States District Court
for the Central District of California. He moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
because he had been abducted by the United States government in violation of the MexicanAmerican Extradition Treaty. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 601 (C.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd sub n o m . United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112
S. Ct. 2188 (1992). The district court granted the motion and ordered the doctor's repatriation to
Mexico based upon the finding that the treaty impliedly prohibited one nation from violating the
territorial integrity of another. Id. at 610, 614.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision based upon its prior holding that an abduction conducted in Mexican territory, sponsored
by the United States and without Mexico's consent, was a violation of the treaty. United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466, 1466-67 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. VerdugoUrquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986
(1992)). The circuit court agreed that the proper remedy for the treaty violation was dismissal of
the indictment and repatriation of Dr. Alvarez-Machain to Mexico.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992). O n remand, the district court judge dismissed the charges
at the close of the prosecution's case for lack of evidence. See Jim Newton, Judge Orders
Camarena Case Defendant Freed, L.A. TIMES,Dec. 15, 1992, at A1 (reporting insufficient proof
offered to show that Dr. Alvarez-Machain had given injections to agent Camarena); Seth
Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in Agent's Killing, N . Y . TIMES,Dec. 15, 1992, at A20 (same).
5. Dr. Alvarez-Machain was allegedly involved in the 1985 abduction and murder of D E A
Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in Guadalajara, Mexico. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
Camarena had been investigating suspected drug lord Rafael Caro-Quintero who, together with
Ernesto Fornesca, was alleged to have ordered the agent's death. Dr. Alvarez-Machain allegedly injected Camarena with lidocaine to keep him alive for prolonged torture by drug kingpins.
Long A r m of the Law; A Decision To Uphold an International Kidnapping Alarms Latin
America, TIME,June 29,1992, at 30. The doctor was one of 22 persons indicted for involvement
in the agent's abduction and murder. Caro-Quintero, 745 F . Supp. at 602. The doctor was
charged under 18 U.S.C. $9 371, 1959 (1988) (conspiracy to commit violence in furtherance of

\
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his office in Guadalajara, Mexico, transported to the United States by bounty
hunters whom the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) had hired,6 and held in
the United States despite Mexico's protest and demands for his r e t ~ r n The
.~
Court did not dispute Dr. Alvarez-Machain's argument that general international jurisdictional law, in the cause of protecting Mexico's territorial sovereignty, prohibited the United States from asserting personal jurisdiction over
him.8 In fact, the Court admitted that the kidnapping "may be in violation of
general international law principle^."^
In disregarding the international law of jurisdiction, the Court for the
first time explicitly distinguished between abductions that violate general
principles of international law and those that violate extradition treaty obligations. The Court determined that only those abductions that violate treaty
obligations are cause for denying jurisdiction.l0 The understanding of the
general principles of international law that allows the Court to draw this distinction is the crux of the decision. It not only results in the Court's failure to
apply general international jurisdictional law, but it correspondingly wrongly
causes the Court to focus its analysis on the United States-Mexican bilateral
extradition treatyl1 and, ultimately, to conclude that the absence of an antiabduction provision in that treaty provided a legally sufficient basis for the
United States to kidnap Dr. Alvarez-Machain.12
Although the Court concluded that it need not apply the international
law of jurisdiction, the Court failed to articulate the basic understanding of
racketeering activity); 18 U.S.C. 9 1959(a)(2) (1988) (violence in furtherance of racketeering
activity); 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(5), (c) (1988) (conspiracy to kidnap a federal agent); 18 U.S.C.
1201(a)(5) (1988) (kidnapping of a federal agent); and 18 U.S.C. §§ l l l l ( a ) , 1114 (1988 &
Supp. I11 1991) (felony murder of a federal agent). Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190 n.1.
6. The D E A had promised to pay Mexican contacts for Dr. Alvarez-Machain's delivery t o
the United States. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603. Mexicans, as agents of the DEA, kidnapped Dr. Alvarez-Machain from his medical offices in Guadalajara, Mexico, and flew him to
El Paso, Texas, where he was taken into custody. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
7. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2190. Mexico responded to the abduction by a timely
diplomatic note to the United States Department of State from the Mexican Embassy requesting
details of any possible United States involvement in Dr. Alvarez-Machain's abduction. A second diplomatic note to the Department of State demanded Dr. Alvarez-Machain's return and
voiced the Mexican government's protest that the doctor's kidnapping violated the procedures
established in the extradition treaty. A third diplomatic note requested the extradition of D E A
special agent Hector Berrellez and D E A informant Antonio Garate-Bustamante for prosecution
in Mexico for crimes related to the abduction. Id. at 2196 n.16, 2197 nn.1-2.
8. Id. at 2195.
9. Id. at 2196. This article refers to "international law" as the system of law governing
relations between nation-states, rather than the law governing domestic relations within the respective nation-states. Recognized sources of international law include treaties, custom, and
general principles of law common to civilized countries. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)];Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 art. 38(l)(a)-(c), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060. See infra note 97 for further explanation of sources of international law.
10. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2197.
11. Id. at 2194-97.
12. Id. at 2195-96.
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jurisdiction upon which its analysis was built, the provisions of the international law of jurisdiction governing abductions, or the relationship between
international law and domestic law which would lead the Court to an understanding of which authority to apply. In order, therefore, to determine
whether the Court should have applied the international law of jurisdiction, I
first describe how the Court should have approached the type of jurisdictional concerns found in the Alvarez-Machain case. Specifically, I explain
why the Court should have ascertained and applied the legal authority which
actually granted the relevant jurisdictional authority to the United States. I
then demonstrate why the international law of jurisdiction, which prohibits
abductions, is that legal authority. Finally, I explain why the doctrine of dualism, which allows states to disregard substantive international law, cannot be
applied to international jurisdictional law. This article does not attempt to
establish a normative basis for a new international jurisdictional system.
Rather, operating within the positivist tradition,13 this article is limited to
assessing whether the Alvarez-Machain Court applied the existing jurisdictional paradigm in holding that the United States had personal jurisdiction
over Dr. Alvarez-Machain.
To develop the above issues, this article is specifically structured as follows: Part I identifies the nature of the jurisdictional issues suggested by the
abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. I differentiate between the utilization of
jurisdictional limits as a mechanism to allocate authority between governing
entities and the utilization of jurisdictional limits as a means to protect the
rights of defendants. I then explain why the body of this article focuses on
the jurisdictional law which is concerned with allocating authority between
governing entities. In Part 11, I present the relevant allocational jurisdictional
framework. This framework provides that whenever faced with a choice between competing jurisdictional laws, emanating from more than one authority, which could possibly be applied to limit the jurisdictional power of a
governing entity, courts should apply the law from the authority that actually
grants jurisdiction to that governing entity. In Part 111, I describe the paradigm underlying the nation-state system. I explore the inherent implications
of the concept of territorial sovereignty as they relate to the international
jurisdictional law specifically prescribing abductions. In Part IV, I explain
why another implication of this concept of territorial sovereignty is that international law is the source of jurisdictional law that should be applied in our
domestic courts. After demonstrating that the Alvarez-Machain Court assumed that the United States Constitution was the source of applicable jurisdictional law, I explain that the Court erred in failing to apply the
international law of jurisdiction as the correct authority. In Part V, I review
the specifics of the Court's interpretation of the United States-Mexican bilateral extradition treaty and demonstrate that the Court employed the treaty as
13. A positivist legal analysis attempts to discern the law as it has actually developed. In
contrast, a normative analysis offers rationale to justify a given legal standard. Legal positivism
in international law is generally associated with the idea that legitimate international legal authority flows primarily from the consent of nation-states.
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a decoy to displace the international law of jurisdiction that prohibits abductions. I show how the Court interpreted the treaty in such a way so as effectively to create an international law of its own invention that permitted Dr.
Alvarez-Machain's abduction. In Part VI, I explain that the dualist theory of
the relationship between the domestic and international legal systems, which
provides a theoretical basis for judicial deference to state violations of substantive international law, cannot be extended to permit state violations of
international jurisdictional law. In Part VII, I review past judicial precedent
and conclude that until the Alvarez-Machain decision, abduction cases in the
United States had been consistent with the paradigm underlying the state
system described in this article. Finally, this article concludes with an assessment of the detrimental implications of the Alvarez-Machain opinion.

In order to analyze the Alvarez-Machain decision properly, one must
understand the nature of the jurisdictional issue presented in the case. This
understanding will make it possible to derive a basic framework which can be
used to assess the decision. The DEA's commissioned abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico14 raises jurisdictional concerns about both the
allocation of governmental authority and the protection of the defendants'
rights. Jurisdictional concerns surrounding the allocation of governmental
authority raise the question of whether the United States, acting without
Mexico's permission, can legally exercise law enforcement activities within
Mexican territory. Jurisdictional concerns about protecting the rights of defendants raise the question of whether fugitives themselves enjoy a basic
right not to be abducted by a foreign government, and if so, whether the
United States has the power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant abducted
in such a manner.
The jurisdictional analysis presented in this article, however, only attempts to understand and critique the basis for the Supreme Court's determination that the United States courts need not apply the international law
which concerns the allocation of authority between nation-states. (I will call
this "allocational jurisdiction.") While there are substantial indications that
international law has progressed both to recognize the right of defendants to
be free from arbitrary arrests and to view derogations of such rights as having
jurisdictional implications, a detailed discussion of the implications of this
development for the Alvarez-Machain decision is outside the parameters of
this article.15 Having so narrowed the issue, I begin my analysis by construct14. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
15. The Alvarez-Machain opinion was likely premised on the assumption that this law does

not exist. The Court failed to discuss the possibility that international law recognizes the rights of
a defendant not to be abducted, much less whether that right should be applied in the United
States. Accordingly, this article will also be limited to assessing the implication for domestic
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ing a framework that demonstrates the need for courts to identify the proper
legal authority that determines the jurisdictional competence of the governmental entity whose jurisdictional power is in question.

judicial application which flows from the clearly existing jurisdictional paradigm allocating authority between nation-states. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text. By so limiting my
task, I do not wish to imply, however, either that international law does not protect the right of
defendants or that this law should not be applied by American courts. Assuming two progressive changes within international law have transpired, the basis for a doctrine that would bar the
exercise of personal jurisdiction gained in violation of a defendant's rights would exist.
First, of course, it would have t o be established that there is an international right not t o be
subject to state-sponsored abductions. While this right is not specifically guaranteed in any of
the international human rights instruments, several commentators have convincingly argued that
it is within the penumbra of rights protecting individuals against arbitrary governmental actions
which are not, to use the American terminology, in accord with due process of law. John
Quigley, Government Vigilantes at Large: The Danger to Human Rights from Kidnapping of
Suspected Terrorists, 10 H U M . RTS.Q. 193, 204-05 (1988) ("In any case of abduction, there is
violation of personal liberty, of the right to be detained under legal authority, of the right of
emigration, of the right to remain in a state until expelled, and of the right to seek asylum."); see
also Martin Feinrider, Extraterritorial Abductions: A Newly Developing Znternational Standard,
14 AKRONL. REV. 27, 37 (1980) ("There has been a major development in international law
which justifies a further search for international protection for the victims of extraterritorial
abductions: the development, over the past several decades, of international human rights law
and the concomitant [sic] change in status of the individual into a subject of international law.").
In addition to establishing the international right not to be subject to state sponsored abductions, for jurisdiction to be defeated, it would also have to be established that a state does not
have legal authority to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant whose presence was secured by a
violation of that international right. Currently, as this article will explain, governing entities do
not have the authority to exercise jurisdiction that encroaches on the exclusive jurisdiction of
other states. Nonetheless, personal jurisdiction in criminal cases has not been so explicitly tied
to international human rights concerns. American courts have, however, begun t o create a domestic doctrine connecting the two concepts. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit introduced the doctrine when it ruled that due process required the court to divest
itself of jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who was tortured while being abducted from
overseas. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). The court based its decision
upon the "shock the conscience" test associated with the constitutional concept of fundamental
fairness as first enunciated in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Toscanino, 500 F.2d at
275. The Second Circuit later narrowly interpreted its holding in Toscanino to make clear that
only outrageous physical brutality would defeat jurisdiction in United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975), and United States v. Lira,
515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). Circuit courts are split in their application of what has been termed the "shocking and outrageous government conduct7' exception t o
the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. See generally Andrew B . Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on Drugs, 23 V A N DJ.. TRANSNAT'L
L. 385, 419 nn.226-27 (1990)
(questioning vitality of Toscanino exception); Jonathan Gentin, Comment, Government-Spunsored Abduction of Foreign Criminals Abroad: Reflections on United States v. Caro-Quintero
and the Inadequacy of the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine, 40 EMORY
L.J. 1227, 1241-43 (1991) (Supreme
Court's recent decision in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), may foreclose courts from
relying on objective constitutional threshold to analyze government misconduct); Andrew
Wolfenson, Note, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under ZnterINT'L L.J. 705, 724-38 (1989-1990) (tracing appellate court applicanational Law, 13 FORDHAM
tion of Toscanino case as exception to Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
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The framework which prescribes the way in which courts should approach jurisdictional problems concerning the allocation o f governmental authority can be derived from the allocational jurisdictional concept itself.
Jurisdiction employed in this way acts as a mechanism for channeling government authority into discrete and politically justifiable organizational units.
Without it, there would be no way to accomplish effectively the intricate and
myriad tasks necessary for governing a modern complex society.16 There
would be no way to determine which government entity could legally exercise its power in what area and there would be no way to attach responsibility
for an entity's failure to carry out government functions.
To make a simple illustration, the Bureau of Motor Vehicles in my home
state of Pennsylvania could, instead of issuing driver's licenses, attempt to
determine who had to register for military conscription, promulgate United
States income tax regulations, mimic the role of the United Nations Security
Council by passing decrees purporting to mandate international sanctions on
a foreign nation, or even claim the ability to capture and try a capital offender. Other government units could do likewise. This would obviously
make it impossible to organize global social life. By drawing upon a coherent
organizational scheme to delineate the relative spheres of authority of the
various government entities, and then legally mandating institutional compliance with these limits, jurisdictional law functions to channel governmental
regulatory authority coherently.
This concept of allocational jurisdiction would be meaningless if there
was not a clear system that defined the distribution of power between the
various government entities. Therefore, inherent in this jurisdictional model
is the idea that this law and order must flow from an identifiable authority.17
Thus, whenever differing jurisdictional laws emanating from more than one
16. Lawyer and social theorist Max Weber explored the concept of bureaucracy in Economy and Society, a work which, although unfinished when he died in 1920, identified and described the importance in modem bureaucratic society of, what I am calling, allocational
OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLAND SOCIETY: A N OUTLINE
jurisdiction. 3 MAXWEBER,ECONOMY
OGY 954 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. & Ephraim 13schoff et al. trans., 1st ed. 1968).
Weber determined that there were certain principles common to all modem governing structures. Among these, the most basic was that of jurisdiction. According to Weber, "[r]ationally
regulated association within a structure of domination finds its typical expression in bureaucracy
. . . [which] is fully developed in political . . . communities only in the modem state." Id. at 956.
Of the characteristics essential to a rationally regulated modern bureaucratic structure, the requirement of jurisdictional delineation of authority held the highest priority. Id.
17. Id. at 956-57. Weber further states that "[tlhe principles of office hierarchy . . . stipulate
a clearly established system . . . , and that the principle of hierarchical office authority is found in
all bureaucratic structures." Id. at 957. See infra note 64 for further reference t o this material.
See also H.L.A. HART,THE CONCEPTOF LAW24-25 (1961) (identifying need for single source of
jurisdictional law). See generally SIMONROBERTS,ORDERAND DISPUTE: A N INTRODUCTION
TO LEGALANTHROPOLOGY
137-47, 168-83 (1979) (discussing hierarchical dispute resolution in
state organizations).
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legal authority could reasonably be applied to a jurisdictional issue, the authority which actually grants jurisdiction to the government entity must be
determined and the rule of law promulgated by that authority must be
applied.
To address whether the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain should have
applied the international law of jurisdiction as the legal authority, one must
determine whether the international legal system is the proper source of the
jurisdictional law that governs whether the United States has personal jurisdiction over a fugitive abducted from another country without that country's
consent. Usually, within any given domestic system there is no question
about the jurisdictional law to be applied. For example, within the American
federal bureaucracy the source of jurisdiction among the various government
agencies is well-settled. It is clear, for instance, that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) was granted authority pursuant to an act of Congress, the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,ls to promulgate rules regulating the
food and drug industries in the United States. Congress itself, it has been
established,lg was granted the authority to legislate in this area by the socalled Interstate Commerce Clause found in Article I, Section 8 of the
United States C o n s t i t ~ t i o n . ~ ~
Unlike the jurisdictional law which operates solely within our domestic
system, where the sources of jurisdictional law and the various governing
bodies unto which they grant jurisdiction have been explicitly delineatedY2l
the sources of authority governing the international distribution of jurisdiction have not been explicitly delineated. The source of the international jurisdictional power, however, can be inferred from the paradigm upon which
the nation-state system is based. This paradigm, as will become evident, provides the foundation upon which jurisdictional authority is distributed between countries. Therefore, an international jurisdictional decision, such as
Alvarez-Machain, which is inconsistent with this paradigm, necessarily conflicts with the underlying institutional reality upon which the international
order is based. In Part IV, I demonstrate why, under this paradigm, the international law of jurisdiction is the source of the relevant jurisdictional grant
of power to the United States and should, therefore, be applied to prohibit
the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants abducted by the United
18. 21 U.S.C.A. $9 301-395 (West 1994).
19. United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432, 434 (1947); see also United States v. Sixty-Two
Packages, 48 F. Supp. 878, 884 (W.D. Wis. 1943) (recognizing that Congress has power under
Commerce Clause to condemn interstate transportation of misbranded drugs), aff'd, 142 F.2d
107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 731 (1944).
20. The source of authority which allocates subject matter jurisdiction among the various
courts and tribunals within the American federal government is equally well-established. See
infra note 69. The allocation of subject matter responsibility between federal and state courts is
also well-settled. Ann Althouse, How To Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State
Power, 100 HARV.L. REV. 1485, 1485-1538 (1987).
21. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. See also LEA BRILMAYER,
JUSTIFYING
INTERNATIONAL
ACTS 13-27 (1989) (discussing political legitimacy and jurisdictional
boundaries).
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States without the consent of the abductee's state. First, however, I must
describe the content of this jurisdictional law and explain its fundamental
relationship to the paradigm underlying the state system.

The international prohibition on asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants whom a foreign state has abducted without permission of the state
where the abduction took place flows from the territorial jurisdictional limits
on state authority inherent in the existing international system, which is
based on territorial sovereignty. Under the classic territorial sovereignty formulation, states possess the full and complete power to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over persons or things within their own territory. This understanding is inherent in the recognized definition of the "state" under international law: "[Aln entity that has a defined territory and a permanent
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or
has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities."22
The notion that a "defined territory and a permanent population" must
be "under the control of its own g ~ v e r n m e n t "is~ ~
in reality nothing more
than a designation that statehood is the manifestation of a state's exercise of
jurisdiction over its territorially defined populace.24 Chief Justice John Mar22. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, § 201. The Restatement states that "the definition
in this section is well-established in international law; it is nearly identical to that in Article 1 of
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 1933,49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881,
165 L.N.T.S. 19." Id. 5 201 cmt. a.
23. Id. 5 201 (emphasis in original). The equation of statehood with coordinated control
over a population within a defined territory is well-accepted. See, e.g., HART,supra note 17, at
216-17 (" 'A state' is not the name of some person or thing inherently or 'by nature' outside the
law; it is a way of referring to two facts: first, that a population inhabiting a territory lives under
that form of ordered government provided by a legal system with its characteristic structure of
legislature, courts, and primary rules; and, secondly, that the government enjoys a vaguely defined degree of independence."); J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International L a w , 5 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 9, 99 & n.406 (1991) (citing H. DOOYEWEERD,
DE STRIJDOM HET SOUVEREINI T E ~ S B E G R I PI N DE MODERNE
RECHTS-ENSTAATSLEER
54 (1950)) (defining the state as "the
institutional community of a government and subjects, regulated by public law on the historical
foundation of a monopolistic organization of the power of the sword (political authority) within
LAW WITH A
a defined territory."); cf: HENRYWHEATON,ELEMENTSOF INTERNATIONAL
SKETCHOF THE HISTORYOF THE SCIENCE51, 98-129 (Philadelphia, Carey, Lea & Blanchard
1836) ("A sovereign state is generally defined t o be any nation or people, whatever may be the
form of its internal constitution, which governs itself independently of foreign powers.").
24. This closely accords with the common understanding of the necessary link between govINTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT
87
ernmental control and jurisdiction. See CLYDEEAGLETON,
(3d ed. 1957) ("The most important right-and
duty-of
a state is jurisdiction. It is solidly established in jurisprudence. . . . From the viewpoint of sovereignty, jurisdiction means internal
sovereignty, exclusive control over all persons and things within its territory."). Georg
Schwarzenberger stated the principle with authoritative support:
State sovereignty and State jurisdiction are complementary terms. Territorial sovereignty cannot limit itself to its negative side, i.e., the exclusion of the activities of other
States, but equally fulfills a positive function: "It serves to divide between nations the
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shall, writing in The Schooner Exchange v. M ' F a d d ~ n ,provided
~~
what became the classic American description of this grant of jurisdictional power:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a d i m i n u t i o n o f its s o v e r e i g n t y to t h e

extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to
the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a
nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of
the nation itself.26
space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points
the minimum of protection of which international law is the guardian." ~ u r t h e r m o r e ,
in principle, State sovereignty and State jurisdiction are co-extensive. As the Permanent Court of Arbitration held in the case of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries (1910),
"the right to regulate the liberties conferred by the Treaty of 1818 is an attribute of
sovereignty, and as such must be held to reside in the territorial sovereign, unless the
contrary be provided . . . [.I One of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to
be exercised within the territorial limits, and that, failing proof t o the contrary, the
territory is conterminous with the sovereignty."
1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW 79-80 (1945) [hereinafter
SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW] (quoting, respectively, Island of Palmas (U.S. v.
Neth.), at 17 [2 R.I.A.A. 829, 8391 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), and North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
(U.K. v. U.S.), at 114 [Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141, 1571 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1910)); see a k o GEORG
SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND ORDER 239 (George W. Keeton & Georg
Schwarzenberger eds., 1971) [hereinafter SCHWARZENBERGER,
LAWAND ORDER]("In international law, jurisdiction is the complement of State sovereignty.").
International tribunals have articulated the correlation between sovereignty and temtoriality. The International Court of Justice stated, "By sovereignty, we understand the whole body of
rights and attributes which a State possesses in its territory, to the exclusion of all other States,
and also in its relations with other States." Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 39 (Apr.
9). In Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), Max Huber wrote,
"Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard to
a portion of the globe [territory] is the right to exercise therein, t o the exclusion of any other
State, the functions of a State." Id. at 838.
25. I1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
26. Id. at 136. Marshall's statement is perhaps the best known American articulation of the
territorial principle of jurisdiction. The doctrine-of territoriality had, however, been previously
described in the famous maxims formulated by Ulricus Huber (Huberus), a Dutch jurist of the
~
translated and reprinted in DAVIES,
17th century. See ULRICUSHUBER,DE C O N F L ILEGUM,
THE INFLUENCEOF HUBER'SDE C O N F L I ~ LEGUM
U
ON ENGLISH
PRIVATEINTERNATIONAL
LAW49 (1937). These maxims were later identified by Joseph Story as the laws which prescribed
the territorial jurisdictional limits on governmental power. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory o f State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP.CT. REV.241,259-62 (1965) (explaining Story's
role in shaping the jurisdictional rules); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One-Hundred Years Afrer, 48 HARV.L. REV. 15, 16 & n.9, 17 (1934) (explaining
that Huber's announcement of doctrine of territoriality preceded Story's commentaries); see also
Ernest G . Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict o f Laws, 20 COLUM.L. REV.
247, 271 n.l10 (1920). The doctrine of territorial jurisdiction has not changed significantly over
(THIRD),
time and remains the basis of international jurisdictional law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
supra note 9, 5 206(a) & cmt. b (describing state sovereignty and jurisdiction over its territory);
OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW 287-91 (4th ed. 1990) (same);
IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES
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Despite the inherently territorial character of the state, many assertions
of state authority do not lend themselves to being neatly circumscribed by
territorial restraints. Thus, Marshall's statement merits some q ~ a l i f i c a t i o n . ~ ~
Richard Falk has explained:
[A]s Marshall was ready to acknowledge and to apply in Schooner
Exchange, the fundamental spatial allocation must be modified to
accommodate many situations of interaction between states. Not all
events can be meaningfully located in space, and reference to the
place where most of the constituent acts are performed often is not
the state with the best claim of legal c o m p e t e n ~ e . ~ ~
Falk elaborates on the ways in which international law has accommodated
this problem:
This has induced an expansion of the territorial allocation of legal
competence to authorize the assertion of control over events with
only a remote spatial contact with the claimant state. It has also
CHARLESC. HYDE,INTERNATIONAL
LAW$5 220, 244 (2d rev. ed. 1945) (describing state's sovereignty and jurisdictional boundaries); SCHWARZENBERGER,
LAWAND ORDER,supra note 24,
ch. 5 (describing function of sovereignty in current international law); Luzius Wildhaber, SoverAND PROCESS
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW425,
eignty and International Law, in THE STRUCTURE
441 (R. MacDonald & Douglas Johnston eds., 1983) (describing concept of territorial
jurisdiction).
Territorial jurisdiction principles are codified as major constitutional principles of the
OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL
United Nations organization. See, e.g., I LASSAOPPENHEIM,
LAW$ 169 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (observing that "[tlhe exclusive
dominion of a state within its territory is basic t o the international system and Article 2.4 of the
United Nations Charter accordingly requires all members to 'refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any State' "). The constituent documents of regional organizations also include language guaranteeing territorial jurisdiction. American states, for example, provide in Articles 9 and 12 of
the Charter of the Organization of American States that
[Tlhe State has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its
preservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate
concerning its interests, to administer its services, and to determine the jurisdiction and
competence of its courts. The exercise of these rights is limited only by the exercise of
the rights of other States in accordance with international law. . . . Jurisdiction of States
within the limits of their national territory is exercised equally over all the inhabitants,
whether nationals or aliens.
Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, arts. 9, 12, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2419,
119 U.N.T.S. 3, 54,56. Nation-states' underlying concern in maintaining international law principles that guarantee them exclusive control over their respective territories is the desire to maintain political authority. Encroachment on this exclusive authority is a direct threat to the
"territorial integrity" of a state, similar t o the unleashing of invading armies. This is because a
regime that allows another government to assert political authority within its territory will find
its own political authority jeopardized.
27. This article addresses only the allocation of horizontal authority between states. Increasingly, interventions by the United Nations and other international organizations supported
by changing notions of what should be exclusively reserved for the domestic realm are vertically
challenging the notion that states have exclusive jurisdiction over what transpires inside their
territories.
28. RICHARDFALK,THE ROLEOF DOMESTIC
COURTSIN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGALORDER 30 (1964).
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induced the formulation of supplementary principles of legal competence each of which in special contexts appears to provide a more
persuasive defense of a jurisdictional claim than . . . could be given
by resort to the territorial principle.29
Falk lists the supplemental principles of jurisdiction which have gained acceptance in varying degrees:
[Tlhe nationality principle (the actor was a national of the claimant
state) . . . the protective principle (the act threatened some vital
national interest such as the security or the credit of the claimant
state, e.g., counterfeiting its currency) . . . the passive personality
principle (the victim of the act was a national of the claimant state),
or . . . the universality principle (the act is so contrary to international order that its mere commission is enough to give legal competence to any state that can obtain custody of the actor, e.g.,
piracy).30
However, as Falk makes clear, Marshall's notion of exclusive territorial jurisdiction "remains an accurate account of the major allocation of competence
[and, most important for our purposes], especially in regard to enforcement
aspects of legal control."31
29. Id. at 31-32.
30. Id. at 32.
31. Id. at 29. Today, the concept of jurisdiction in international law has been separated for
purposes of analytical clarity into three categories: prescriptive jurisdiction, referring to the
power of a state to legislate or prescribe its substantive laws extraterritorially; enforcement jurisdiction, referring to the power of a state to enforce its laws or perform executive acts outside
of its territory; and adjudicative jurisdiction, referring to the power of a state to assert personal
jurisdiction usually by way of a court exercising control over a foreign or offshore defendant so
as to render a judgment having legal effect. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD),supra note 9, pt. IV,
chs. 1-3 (discussion of international jurisdiction law organized according to these distinctions);
see also I OPPENHEIM,
supra note 26, 5 136 (describing concepts of jurisdiction in international
law); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International L a w , 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 145, 145-212
(1973) (same, using slightly different terminology); David J. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: Znternational Law Restraints o n the Reach of National Laws, 10 YALEJ . INT'L L. 185, 189-90 (1984)
(describing prescriptive jurisdiction); Bruce Zaganis & Jay Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional
Considerations in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL.W . INT'LL.J. 303, 316-31 (1985) (describing international jurisdiction with respect to United States' criminal jurisdiction).
This article only addresses adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction. See infra note 40 and
accompanying text. Because the ability to achieve legislative policy goals within national boundaries is often affected by activities which occur outside of national boundaries, national legislative schemes often prescribe activity outside national boundaries. In addition, international law
accepts that states can generally prescribe the activities of their citizens even when in foreign
territories. Therefore, Falk's "expansion of the territorial allocation of legal competence" and
"supplementary principles" are most relevant to jurisdiction to prescribe laws. FALK,supra note
28, at 31-32. Mann distinguishes between enforcement jurisdiction, which continues to be strictly
limited by territorial principles, and prescriptive jurisdiction, which does not, as follows:
Indeed, the fact that a State has legislative jurisdiction in respect of a crime committed
abroad does not authorize it to send police officers into a foreign State to arrest the
criminal and carry him across the frontier, or to send its judges into the foreign State to
sit there as a court and try the case. There can be no question of the two jurisdictions
coinciding. That a State which has legislative jurisdiction may apply and enforce it in its
own territory is undoubted and involves no problem. Enforcement jurisdiction, how-
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Because police operations and, in particular, the capture of criminal suspects naturally occur within a clearly defined territory, such operations serve
as classic examples of state activities over which the allocation of jurisdictional control continues to be governed exclusively by territorial principle^.^^
For this reason, the international jurisdictional law addressing the allocation
of authority between states as it relates to state jurisdiction over criminal
defendants is well-defined.33 Stemming from states' exclusive territorial sovereignty, they may, under the general principles of international law, at their
discretion, extradite,34 grant asylum,35 or exercise authority in some other
ever, is concerned with putting a State's legislative jurisdiction into effect in another
country. As a matter of firm principle this cannot be done without the consent of the
State in which the act of enforcement takes place. The rights of the territorial sovereign prevail. The international order would be gravely prejudiced if it were otherwise. . . . [Therefore,] a conviction obtained in such circumstances would, it is
submitted, itself be unlawful.
F.A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Law Revisited After Twenty Years, 186 R.C.A.D.I. 9,
37, 39 (1984).
32. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
33. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
34. "Extradition" is defined as the process by which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime under the law of one state is arrested in another state and returned for trial or punishment.
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, pt. IV, ch. 7, introductory note, at 556-57. Extradition,
which often occurs pursuant to the obligatory provisions of a bilateral extradition treaty, is a
legal procedure that tends to be more procedurally cumbersome than either deportation or exclusion of an international fugitive. See infra note 39.
International law does not require states to surrender fugitives in the absence of a treaty
creating the obligation. Judge Bedjaoui recently reaffirmed the principle specifically as it applies
to a stite3s own citizenry in-his opinion in Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and A p plication of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, which
arose from the bombing of the PanAmerican airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland and was recently
argued before the International Court of Justice: "Without entering into the merits of the case, I
would point out that, as is well known, there does not exist in international law any rule that
prohibits, or, on the contrary, imposes the extradition of nationals." Case Concerning Questions
of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114, 'A 12 (Apr. 14)
(Bedjaoui, J., dissenting). The doctrine is authoritatively established. See, e.g., I OPPENHEIM,
supra note 26, 5 415; 6 MARJORIE
WHITEMAN,
DIGESTOF INTERNATIONAL
LAWch. XVI, 5 3
(1968); IV JOHNB. MOORE,A DIGESTOF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5 580 (1906). There was a
contrasting historical minority rule, but that is no longer applicable today. See I1 HUGOGROOF INTERNATIONAL
TIUS,D E JUREBELLIAC PACIS'1(¶ 527-28 (1625), translated in CLASSICS
LAW (Scott ed. 1913) (understanding extradition to be a duty imposed by international law
under some circumstances).
In addition to fulfilling the allocational jurisdictional function of allowing states to secure
the return of wanted fugitives, which is consistent with the principles of territorial sovereignty,
see supra note 26 and accompanying text, some states have chosen to build into extradition
treaties and corresponding domestic legislation protections for the rights of defendants. "The
law of extradition as reflected in treaties and statutes . . . balances the demands of the international legal order that serious crime not go unpunished with concern that persons accused of
crime not be subjected to unfair methods o f adjudication or
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, 5 476 cmt. a (citations omitted). See generally id. at pt. IV, ch. 7, subchapter B (describing United States law on extradition); M. CHERIFBASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION
A N D WORLDPUBLIC
ORDER560-75 (1974) (discussing traditional law of extradi-
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manner over fugitives who are present within their territory and wanted by
foreign states.
As a logical extension of this law, states may not ascertain jurisdiction
over foreign defendants by abducting them. The obvious complement to the
full and complete sovereignty that each state has within its own territory is
that these same states cannot exercise administrative powers in foreign states
and, specifically, cannot arrest fugitives within those foreign states without
the states' p e r m i ~ s i o n .Such
~ ~ prohibitions may frustrate the ability for states
tion and suggesting "World Public Order" model of extradition); IVANA. SHEARER,EX-I-RADIIN INTERNATIONAL
LAW passim (1971) (describing law of extradition); Research in
International Law Drafr Convention on Extradition, 29 AM.J . INT'L L. 15, 21-240 (Supp. 1935)
(containing draft convention on extradition with bibliography and commentary).
35. "Asylum" refers to a state granting safe-haven to individuals who are wanted by foreign
authorities by admitting them to and later allowing their continued presence within state borders. States' competence to grant asylum is authoritatively established as derivative of territorial
sovereignty.
The fact that every state exercises territorial supremacy over all persons on its temtory,
whether they are its nationals or aliens, excludes the exercise of the power of foreign
states over [their own] nationals in the territory of another state. Thus, a foreign state
is, provisionally at least, an asylum for every individual who, being prosecuted at home,
crosses its frontier. . . . [Sltates have always upheld their competence to grant asylum, if
they choose to do so.
supra note 26, 5 402. The weight of scholarly opinion has traditionally supported
I OPPENHEIM,
this principle. See HYDE,supra note 26, 5 310 (describing right of state to grant asylum t o those
AND INTERSTATERENDITION9 9 (1891)
in its territory); I JOHN B. MOORE,EXTRADITION
(same); I OPPENHEIM,
supra note 26, 5 402 n.2 (listing informative sources on the right of asylum
generally); WHEATON,
supra note 23, at 211 (describing right of state t o grant asylum generally).
36. The uncontroverted rule is:
It is universally recognized, as a corollary of state sovereignty, that officials of one state
may not exercise their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's
consent. Thus, while a state may take certain measures of nonjudicial enforcement
against a person in another state . . . , its law enforcement officers cannot arrest him in
another state, and can engage in criminal investigation in that state only with that
state's consent.
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, 5 432 cmt. b. In addition, international principles defining
the limits of judicial assistance likewise provide that "[tlhe underlying principle of international
law . . . is that a state may not conduct official activities in the territory of another state without
that state's consent, express or implied." Id. ch. 7, subchapter A, introductory note, at 526. This
rule of international law is a logical extension of the principle of territorial sovereignty: "When
done without consent of the foreign government, abducting a person from a foreign country is a
. . . blatant violation of the territorial integrity of another state . . . ." Louis Henkin, A Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J . MARSHALL
L. REV. 215, 231 (1992), cited in United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188,2202 n.24 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writings of
other commentators similarly reflect the understanding that the international rule banning kidnapping flows directly from the concept of territorial sovereignty: The territorial principle "reflects one aspect of the sovereignty exercisable by a state in its territorial home, and is the
indispensable foundation for the application of the series of legal rights that a state possesses."
MALCOLMN. SHAW,INTERNATIONAL
LAW 400 (3d ed. 1991); accord HYDE, supra note 26,
8 321, at 1031-32; F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach o f
International Law, INTERNATIONAL
LAWAT A TIMEOF PERPLEXITY:ESSAYSI N HONOUROF
SHABATIROSENNE
407 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tobory eds., 1989); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to Extradition, 7 VAND.J . TRANSTION
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to prosecute defendants because, contrary to civil cases,37in criminal cases in
the United States and many other countries, defendants must be physically
brought before the court. This is thought necessary to secure the defendants'
right to notice of the proceedings against them, the right to defend themselves, and the right to confront their accusers.38
If a defendant can be arrested within the territorial jurisdiction of the
prosecuting state, there is, of course, no violation of the international law of
territorial jurisdiction. However, if the defendant is residing in a foreign
L. 25, 28 (1973); Michael H. Cardozo, Note, When Extradition Fails, Is Abduction the
Solution?, 55 AM.J. INT'LL. 127, 132 (1961); Manuel R. Garcia-Mora, Criminal Jurisdiction of a
State over Fugitives Brought from a Foreign Country by Force or Fraud: A Comparative Study, 32
IND.L.J. 427, 428-29 (1957); Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Jurisdiction of a State over a Defendant Based upon Presence Secured by Force or Fraud, 37 MINN.L. &v. 91,92-93 (1953); Kathryn
Selleck, Comment, Jurisdiction Afrer International Kidnapping: A Comparative Study, 8 B.C.
INT'L & COMP.L. REV. 237, 237 (1985).
37. Courts can assert jurisdiction over civil defendants even if they never appear before the
court by providing proper notice of the proceedings against them. Without the need for a physical incursion by United States law enforcement agents into the foreign state where the defendant
is resident to capture illegally the defendant, the assertion of civil jurisdiction over an offshore
defendant does not violate the exclusive jurisdiction of foreign states t o exercise law enforcement activities within its own territory. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, $ 478 cmt. e; LEA
TO JURISDICTION
IN m AMERICAN
FEDERALSYSTEM 330
BRILMAYER,
A N INTRODUCTION
(1986) (explaining possible reasons for different requirements for civil and criminal jurisdiction).
I argue elsewhere that, in civil cases involving foreign (as opposed to offshore) plaintiffs or
defendants, international rather than domestic jurisdictional law should be applied by domestic
courts. Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law
of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, HARV.INT'LL.J. (forthcoming 1995). Because t e m torial sovereignty, which I demonstrate in this article to be internationally prescribed, is not
violated in civil cases, that article more comprehensively explores the nature of the existing allocation of prescriptive authority between the domestic and international orders. Based on this
exploration, the article concludes that the state cannot self-prescribe its own law of civil jurisdiction. Id.
38. In the United States, for example, the presence of the criminal defendant is constitutionally required pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation which states, in pertinent part, that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be
confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST.amend. VI. More specifically, the accused's physical presence is constitutionally required t o initiate prosecution, although a trial in
progress may in limited circumstances proceed without the presence of the criminal defendant.
E.g., Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372-73 (1892) (common law secures criminal defendant's right to be present for duration of trial); accord Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,1015-20 (1988)
(reaffirming importance of confrontation right constitutionally provided to criminal defendant);
United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) ("The constitutional right to presence is
rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment . . . .") (citing
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (addressing effect of defendant's disruptive conduct during
trial proceedings on confrontation right)); Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912) (asserting that Sixth Amendment constitutional right to be heard requires criminal defendant's
presence at trial); see also Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973) (recognizing valid
waiver of defendant's right to confrontation pursuant to accused's voluntary absence after commencement of proceeding in non-capital case); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-08
(1934) (holding Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process requires defendant's presence
only to extent necessary to ensure fair trial), overruled on other grounds, Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
NAT'L
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state, "informal r e n d i t i ~ n , "extradition,
~~
or physical abduction are the only
means of securing the defendant's physical presence in the prosecuting state.
When a state secures the requisite physical presence of a defendant by
disregarding the jurisdictional requirements of international law, the state
does not have personal jurisdiction to try the defendant despite the defendant's presence. Comment c to section 432 of the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States states the generally accepted rule
relating the prohibition on illegal abductions to the prohibition on assertions
of jurisdiction:
If a state's law enforcement officials exercise their functions in the
territory of another state without the latter's consent, that state is
entitled to protest and, in appropriate cases, to receive reparation
from the offending state. If the unauthorized action includes abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may
demand return of the person, and international law requires that he
be returned. If the state from which the person was abducted does
not demand his return, under the prevailing view the abducting
state may proceed to prosecute him under its laws.40
39. "Informal" renditions may allow nation-states to secure the return of fugitives without
involving the formal procedures of extradition. See generally RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra
note 9, 9 475 reporters' note 6, 5 478 reporters' note 6 (discussing deportation as alternative to
extradition). See also Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1969); Stevenson v.
United States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1967); R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte
Soblen [I9631 1 Q.B. 829, [I9631 2 Q.B. 243. Exclusion and deportation comprise the two most
common methods of informal rendition, both of which require a unilateral act by the asylum
state that may result in the return of the alien fugitive to the state wanting him for prosecution.
"Exclusion" refers to the asylum state's practice of denying admission to its territory based on
grounds of, for example, lack of proper documentation, suspicious behavior, or physical or
mental affliction. See Alona E. Evans, Acquisition of Custody over the International Fugitive
Offender-Alternatives to Extradition: A Survey of United States Practice, 40 BRIT.Y . B . INT'LL.
77, 82-83 (1964) (defining what exclusion entails under United States law). Once the fugitive has
entered the asylum state's territory, the asylum government must issue an administrative order
directing the foreigner to leave the country through deportation processes. Under deportation
or expulsion (the terms are used interchangeably), the fugitive is generally provided the means
to leave the country voluntarily, a choice of destination states from limited options, and may be
permitted to plead threat of physical persecution if returned to the state of his departure. Id. at
84-85.
A state's unilateral ability to deport or exclude aliens has been historically established in
accordance with the territoriality principle of state power. For example, the Supreme Court
held, in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), that the powers of exclusion and
expulsion are inherent in sovereignty as "an accepted maxim of international law." Nishirnura,
142 U.S. at 659.
40. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, § 432 cmt. c. The overwhelming weight of distinguished commentary confirms the existence of a rule of international law denying states personal
jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign states without the consent of such states. For
example, Lassa Oppenheim states:
It is . . . a breach of international law for a state without permission to send its agents
into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a
crime. Where this has happened, the bffending state should-and
often does-hand
over the person in question to the state in whose territory he was apprehended.
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I OPPENHEIM,
supra note 26, 5 119, at 388 (footnotes omitted); accord T. WALKER,
A MANUAL
OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW50 (1895) (no state may exercise jurisdiction over persons or
property in territory of another state); Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or
Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231, passim (1934) (national court
not competent to subject person to local law if seizure or arrest made in violation of international law); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International
Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265, 266 (1952) (discussing whether local jurisdiction can be
founded on violation of international law); Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition, 36 BRIT.Y.B. INT'LL. 279, 280 (1960) (one state may not perform acts of sovereignty
over another state); Jacques Semmelman, Due Process, International Law, and Jurisdiction over
Criminal Defendants Abducted Extraterritorially: The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine Reexamined, 30
COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 513, 576 (1992) (when nation in which abduction occurred protests,
subsequent prosecution violates international law); Catherine Fisher, U.S. Legislation to ProseL. 915, 933-36
cute Terrorists: Antiterrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?, 18 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L
(1985) (discussing limitations on state's authority to apply its laws in conflict with other state's
interests); Gentin, supra note 15, at 1263 (violation of extradition treaty extinguishes U.S. court
jurisdiction).
State practice is consistent with the rule prohibiting the assertion of personal jurisdiction
following an unpermitted, state-sponsored abduction. See I MOORE,supra note 35, ch. VII,
$5 188-99, at 281-93 (canvassing early United States cases involving state-sponsored abductions);
4 MOORE,supra note 34, 603, at 328-32 (same). While individual instances of state practice
demonstrating the principle are too numerous to mention, some of the more well-known cases
include: Ex parte Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. R. 24, 33 (1981) (international jurisdictional rule of
law precluded jurisdiction); Regina v. Hartley, 2 N.Z.L.R. 199, 217 (C.A. 1978) (adherence to
international jurisdictional rule of law precluded jurisdiction); Affaire Mantovani, Italie et
DE
Suisse, cited in Charles Rousseau, Chronique des Faits Znternationaux, 69 REVUEGENERALE
DROITINTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC761, 834-35 (1965) (Italian police apologized for violation of
Switzerland's territorial sovereignty after Italian police officials failed attempt to arrest and return to Italy an Italian national in Switzerland); The Schnaebele Case, described in I11 TRAVERS,
LE DROITPENALINTERNATIONAL
NO. 1302 (Paris 1924) (German government returned French
police official to France after French government protested acts of German officials luring defendant into Germany); Casablanca Case (Fr. v. Germ.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 110 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1916) (referring to deserters from French Foreign Legion seized by France in Germany);
Case of Nollet, as digested in 18 JOURNAL
DU DROITINTERNATIONAL
1188, 1189 (Cour d'appel
de Douai 1891) (integrity of sovereignty asylum state precluded jurisdiction); see also Lawrence
Preuss, Kidnapping of Fugitives from Justice on Foreign Territory, 29 AM. J. INT'LL. 502, 502-04
(1935) (describing The Jacob-Salomon Case in which Germany ultimately conceded to return
Swiss citizen kidnapped in Switzerland after Swiss government diplomatically protested); Lawrence Preuss, Settlement of the Jacob Kidnapping Case (Switzerland-Germany),30 AM. J. INT'L
L. 123, 124 n.6 (1936) (describing The Blair Case (1876), in which English government returned
English citizen to United States after United States government protested); Selleck, supra note
36, at 260 (discussing In re Jolis, 11933-19341 Ann. Dig. 191 (Tribunal Correctional d'Avesnes), in
which court held arrest of Belgian by French was "a nullity" because Belgian government officially protested to French government).
Consistent with the concept of sovereignty, states can assert jurisdiction if the foreign state
does not object. The international rule on abductions referred to as the doctrine of "male captus,
bene detentus" incorporates this exception which allows for jurisdiction. "Nearly all states have
followed the rule that, absent protest from other states, they will try persons brought before their
courts through irregular means, even through an abduction from another state in violation of
international law." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, § 432 reporters' note 2 (emphasis added). Influential commentary has, however, called for strengthening the international rule by
requiring explicit consent to the assertion of personal jurisdiction by the abducting country. See
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'LL.
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Having described the concept of state sovereignty and its relationship to
international jurisdictional law as prohibiting the assertion of state jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign states without the consent of
those states, I can now explain why this law is the source of the jurisdictional
grant that should be applied in American courts.
IV. THE LEGALSOURCETHATGRANTSJ U R I S D I ~ I O N
TO THE UNITEDSTATES
A. The Alvarez-Machain Court's Mistaken Belief that the United States
Constitution Is the Source of Jurisdictional Law To Be Applied to
Foreign Abductees by Domestic Courts
The framework prescribing the proper method of applying jurisdictional
law makes clear the tautology that once any component within an organizational structure identifies the source of its jurisdictional authority to act, the
jurisdictional rules promulgated by that source must be followed. I will
demonstrate in Section B which follows that the just discussed international
law of jurisdiction is the proper source granting the United States the authority to assert personal jurisdiction over defendants when questions arise concerning the international allocation of jurisdictional authority. The AlvarezMachain Court, however, believes to the contrary that the United States
Constitution is that source.41 The fact that the Court believes the Constitution to be this source of jurisdictional authority is evidenced by the Court's
reliance upon Frisbie v. Collins,42 one of the two major pre-Alvarez-Machain
abduction decisions. Frisbie implicitly held that United States constitutional
law allows for jurisdiction in abduction cases.
Frisbie, unlike the other case which the Court discussed, Ker v. Z l l i n ~ i s , ~ ~
was not an international case. Rather, the defendant in Frisbie was kidnapped in Illinois by Michigan officials and brought before a Michigan state
The Supreme Court, as it had in Ker, looked to the United States
Constitution to ascertain whether the Constitution protected the defendant
435, 442 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter Research in International Law] (Article 16). Article 16
provided:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any
person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its authority by
recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by
such measures.
Id.; see also Andreas F . Lowenfeld, Editorial Comment: Still More on Kidnapping, 85 AM. J .
INT'LL. 655, 661 (1991) (silence should not be construed as consent); cf. Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, Continued, 84 AM. J .
INT'L L. 444, 489 (1990) (citing need for international law principles to safeguard rights of
accused).
41. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (1992).
42. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
43. 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of Ker.
44. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 520.
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from the k i d n a ~ p i n g .Concluding
~~
that the Constitution did not protect the
defendant,46 the Court neglected to consider the possibility that the protection of the territorial sovereignty of Illinois may be a basis for restricting the
Michigan court's assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant. The Frisbie
Court may have incorrectly and quite illogically concluded that although the
international law of jurisdiction did distribute authority within the United
States, that law should nonetheless be ignored. This would have been rather
unlikely, however, given international law's unambiguous prohibition on exMore
~
likely, the Frisbie
traterritorial assertions of personal j u r i ~ d i c t i o n . ~
Court correctly assumed that the allocation of authority between states
within the United States should be distributed in accordance with the United
States Constitution and not international law.48 If so, the Court effectively
held that the United States, at the time of the decision in 1952, was integrated
to a sufficient extent that, unlike the international law protecting the territorial sovereignty of nation-states, the constitutional protections of the sovereignty of the fifty United States no longer meant that one state's
unauthorized arrest of a defendant in another state precluded the first state's
jurisdiction. By relying on Frisbie as precedent, and subsequently failing to
distinguish the constitutional basis for its intra-United States territorial or
lack of territorial divisions, the Alvarez-Machain Court is indicating that it
does not see a distinction between abductions among the fifty states of the
Union and abductions among the nation-states of the international order.
Thus, the Court likely assumes that the United States Constitution applies to
international abduction cases.49
45. Id. at 522.
46. The Frisbie Court proclaimed:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker] that the power of a
court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of 'forcible abduction.' No persuasive reasons
are now presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the sound basis
that due process of law is satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after
having been fairly apprized [sic] of the charges against him and after a fair trial in
accordance with constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice
because he was brought to trial against his will.
Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522, quoted in United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2192
(1992).
47. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
48. International law is not intended to allocate jurisdiction between states within the
United States. "International law addresses the exercise of jurisdiction by a state; it does not
concern itself with the allocation of jurisdiction among domestic courts within a state for example, between national and local courts in a federal system." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),
supra note
9 , 9 421 cmt. f; cf: infra notes 62-95 and accompanying text (discussing international law's role as
allocating jurisdiction between nation-states).
49. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2192-93. For an example of a lower court case that failed
to distinguish properly between the constitutional issues in Ker and the international issues in
Frisbie, see United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68,73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); see
also id. at 72-73 (Oakes, J., concurring) (referring to "abstract doctrine Ker and Frisbie are said
to stand for" as a matter of United States constitutional law) (citations omitted).
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In addition, a belief that the Constitution is the ultimate source of the
grant of personal jurisdiction to the United States would provide an explanation for the Court's distinction that the bilateral extradition treaty, if found to
ban kidnapping, should have been applied to deny jurisdiction while the prohibition under international jurisdictional law should not have been applied.50 The United States-Mexico extradition treaty51 is a self-executing
treaty that was ratified by the United States Senate and is therefore regarded
within the American legal scheme as applicable but subordinate in authority
to the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n .Under
~~
this hierarchy of authority the treaty could be
considered the functional equivalent of a long-arm statute.53 As long as the
United States Constitution grants jurisdiction, and the legislative intent manifest in the treaty does not prohibit the ability of the United States to exercise
the Constitution's grant of jurisdiction, then the assertion of jurisdiction
should be allowed. However, because the international law of jurisdiction is
not thought to be the basic source granting jurisdiction, and it clearly does
not perform the role of a long arm statute, which states prescribe themselves
to limit their own jurisdiction, it has no role in this domestic scheme.54
Further evidence that the Alvarez-Machain Court believed the Constitution to be the definitive source that grants personal jurisdiction to the United
50. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193, 2196.
51. Treaty on Extradition, May 4, 1978, U.S.-United Mexican States, 31 U.S.T. 5059
(T.I.A.S. No. 9656).
52. "By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation,
with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the
land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other." Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S.
190, 194 (1888); accord Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)
(stating the proposition that when treaty is self-executing, court may look "to the treaty for a
rule of decision for the case before it as it would to a statute"); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1829) ("[Olur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it
operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision.").
53. "Long arm statute" refers to legislation fashioned by a forum's government to limit the
jurisdictional reach of its own forum courts. For example, although the United States Constitution prescribes mandatory constraints on jurisdiction, the federal and state legislatures can create
long arm statutes that function to further limit the jurisdictional reach of their respective forums
beyond those constitutional requirements. For further definition, see BLACK'SLAWDICTIONA R Y 942 (6th ed. 1990).
54. Otherwise, it is difficult to ascertain from the decision the theoretical rationale behind
the Court's distinction between general principles of international law as inapplicable and treaty
law as applicable. Based on the traditional doctrine under which the rules of international law
are applied in American courts, this is an unusual distinction. This doctrine establishes that
international law is a part of the law of the United States and should be applied by American
courts when appropriate. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."). As such, there is no basis for distinguishing between self-executing treaties and other
general international legal rules. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. This is qualified by
some commentators who believe that if the two are in conflict, the treaty should take precedence
(THIRD),
supra note 9, $ 115 cmt. d, reover general international legal rules. RESTATEMENT
porters' note 4.
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States is that, when the Court analogously attempts to assert jurisdiction in
civil cases, it appears to believe that the jurisdiction of the United States as a
whole emanates from the Constitution rather than international law.55 For
example, the Court has looked to the United States Constitution when defining the personal jurisdictional reach of the federal courts which, as opposed
to state courts, are agents of the whole of the American sovereign.56
Recognizing the national character of federal courts, some commentators have argued for a "national contacts" test,57 and in certain circumstances
55. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (Due Process Clause prevents state court from exercising personal jurisdiction in a manner violating notions of fair play); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984)
(petitioner's contacts were insufficient to satisfy jurisdictional requirements of Due Process
Clause); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982) (personal jurisdiction flows from Due Process Clause); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952) (Due Process Clause permitted state to take or decline in
personam jurisdiction over foreign corporation).
I explore elsewhere the question of whether the Supreme Court, other courts, and commentators are correct in assuming that the Constitution is the source which grants jurisdiction to the
United States in civil cases involving foreign parties. This question suggests related, though different, problems from those which are explored in this article. See Strauss, supra note 37. On
the one hand, the attempt to assert jurisdiction over criminal defendants can lead, for reasons
unique to criminal jurisdiction, to a potential conflict with the allocation of territorial jurisdiction
between sovereign states. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. On the other hand, jurisdiction over civil defendants may be defeated, for reasons unique to civil jurisdiction, if a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the forum, based on factors other than strict
territoriality, is not established. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Despite these differences, the fact that the Supreme Court is accustomed to looking to the Constitution as the
proper source of the law of jurisdiction in civil cases indicates it is probably doing likewise in
Alvarez-Machain.
56. See, e.g., Ireland, 456 U.S. at 701-05 (assuming United States Constitution prescribes
scope of adjudicatory jurisdictional law to be applied when federal courts attempt to assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
57. E.g., Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17 G A .J .
INT'L & COMP.L. 1, 37, 43 (1987) (proposing heightened constitutional scrutiny of jurisdictional
claims in international cases and stating that national contacts test would be closer to practice of
other nations than current due process analysis); Graham C. Lilly, Jurisdiction over Domestic
and Alien Defendants, 69 V A .L. REV.85, 151 (1983) (analyzing limitations on personal jurisdiction in suits involving aliens and examining utility of national contacts doctrine in both federal
and state court assertions of personal jurisdiction); Irene D. Sann, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Question Suits: Toward a Unified and Rational Theory for Personal Jurisdiction over NonDomiciliary and Alien Defendants, 16 PAC. L.J. 1, 232-33 (1984) (arguing that national contacts
standard in federal questions cases would be rationally related directly to United States as "the
sovereign that is seeking to assert jurisdiction," and that such a standard would promote uniformity of analysis among federal courts); Pamela J. Stephens, The Federal Court Across the
Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RICHL.
REV.697 (1984) (exploring history of personal jurisdiction doctrine and arguing for congressional adoption of a national contacts test based on reasonableness standard); Yvonne L. Blauvelt, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction After Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of
California, 49 OHIOST. L.J. 853,874 (1988) (noting that Supreme Court in Asahi ignored opportunity to provide federal standard of personal jurisdiction in international cases and arguing that
a "foreign defendant's contacts should be with the United States as a whole rather than with a
particular, individual state"); Brian B. Frasch, Comment, National Contacts as a Basis for In
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when deciding whether to allow federal assertions of personal jurisdiction in
civil cases, such a test has been applied.58 Though operating under the assumption that the United States is the relevant jurisdictional entity, courts do
not apply international law to determine the civil defendant's contacts with
the United States when applying the national contacts test. They instead apply the minimum contacts analysis derived from the United States
Con~titution.~~
Finally, in civil procedure, the argument that assertions of personal jurisdiction by the United States emanate from the Constitution and not internaPersonam Jurisdiction over Aliens in Federal Question Suites, 70 C A . L. REV. 686, 707 (1982)
(arguing that "federal courts should be permitted t o aggregate the national contacts of alien
defendants to determine in personam jurisdiction in federal question suits"); Bradley W. Paulson, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Aliens: Unravelling Entangled Case Law, 13 H o u s . J .
INT'L L. 117, 146 (1990) (reviewing incongruous approaches t o personal jurisdiction and suggesting that national contacts test would be most appropriate in federal court assertions of personal jurisdiction); cf. Maryellen Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction in the Federal Caurts, 79 Nw. U.L. REV.1, 85 (1984) (exploring arguments supporting proposition that federal courts can assert personal jurisdiction over all defendants having
minimum contacts with United States, and addressing implications of national contacts test on
application by courts of current personal jurisdiction statutes).
58. In federal question cases, the courts look to the service-of-process provisions, if they
exist within the applicable substantive federal legislation to be applied, for an indication of how
widely t o construe the extent to which they should assert personal jurisdiction. FED.R. CIV. P.
4(e). Provisions have been interpreted to provide that contacts with the United States as a
whole (national contacts), rather than with any of the fifty states, are sufficient t o establish the
personal jurisdiction of the federal forum. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 5 (1994); Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 22 (1976) (same); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 5 78aa (1976)
(same). If such provisions do not exist, or in diversity cases, courts have read various provisions
of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to require that their jurisdiction is determined
by the long arm statute of the state in which they sit. FED.R. CIV. P. 4(f). The rule was recently
amended, however, to provide that in federal question cases, for which there is no applicable
long arm statute, if a foreign defendant does not have contacts with any individual state sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under the state's own long arm statute, but does have contacts with the United States as a whole sufficient to establish the requisite "national contacts"
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, any federal-court can assert personal
jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2).
59. See, e.g.,FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251,256 (5th Cir. 1981) (standing for proposition that, subject only to regulation of Congress, each federal court exercises judicial power of
United States, which is not constitutionally limited by boundaries of particular district, and "due
process requires only that a defendant in a federal suit have minimum contact with the United
States, 'the sovereign that has created the court' ") (citing Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554
(1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting)); accord Askanase v. Fatjo, Civ.A.No. H-91-3140, 1993 WL
208682, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 22,1993) (concluding that bankruptcy laws provide personal jurisdiction anywhere in United States as sovereign authority on federal questions).
The Supreme Court has not determined the constitutionality of the national contacts test.
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Court did mention the
issue:
We have no occasion here to determine whether Congress could, consistent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national contacts, rather than on
the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal court sits.
Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113 n.* (emphasis in original).
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tional law tends to explain why the Supreme Court, when applying the
conventional minimum contacts test to restrict the assertion of jurisdiction
over alien defendants by states within the United States, is only concerned
with whether the individual states have jurisdiction and not with whether the
United States as a whole has j u r i s d i ~ t i o n .If
~ ~under the Constitution one of
the fifty states within the United States may assert personal jurisdiction over
a defendant, then that same document would not logically circumscribe the
jurisdiction of the more encompassing national entity more narrowly. The
Court's failure to consider the jurisdictional relevance of the United States as
a whole, therefore, indicates its implicit understanding that the Constitution
provides the jurisdictional grant of power to the United States.
While implicit rather than explicit, the evidence is persuasive that the
Alvarez-Machain Court based its decision on the belief that the Constitution,
rather than international law, is the source that grants jurisdiction to the
United States.61
60. See, e.g., Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (denying California jurisdiction over Japanese parts
supplier); Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984) (denying Texas
jurisdiction over Columbian corporation); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
439 (1952) (permitting Ohio jurisdiction over Philippine mining corporation). In none of these
cases did the Court question whether the United States as a whole had jurisdiction.
61. There is, however, a possible alternative basis for the Court's disregard of international
law. The Court may believe that the grant of territorial jurisdiction to countries comes from
international law, but that the jurisdictional law relevant to the Court's own ability to assert
personal jurisdiction comes from the Constitution.
The Court could have arrived at this conclusion, that the jurisdiction of courts as distinct
from the state is governed by the Constitution by assuming that, in accordance with the territorial approach to jurisdiction, the Constitution should prescribe assertions of jurisdiction by
American courts located within American territory. If the Court has made the assumption, it
has invented a false distinction between the personal jurisdiction of the state and the personal
jurisdiction of the courts. Because personal jurisdiction is concerned not with courts, but with
the allocation of authority between states of the union within our federal system, or nation-state
within the international system, it concerns the forum state's authority to exercise regulatory
control over the defendant. While the discourse surrounding personal jurisdiction has developed
to sometimes interchangeably refer to "the jurisdiction of the court" and "the jurisdiction of the
forum," the jurisdiction of the court is only at issue to the extent that the court is the particular
institution of the forum state called upon to act on the state's behalf. If a state has personal
jurisdiction over a criminal defendant, it can dispose of the case in any manner it desires. It
could send the case to any of its courts or even subject the defendant to extra-judicial process.
See RESTATEMENT
OF JUDGMENTS § 7 cmt. a, at 41 (1942). ("Although a state has jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, it may not have given to a particular court or it may not have
given to any of its courts power to entertain the action. In such a case the court has no 'competency' to render a valid judgment.").
While other issues of international human rights might be impacted, the authority of the
forum to exercise personal jurisdiction based on the territorial concern with the allocation of
authority between states would remain unaffected. Because the distinction between the personal
jurisdiction of the state and that of the court is a false one, what is really at issue is not the
question of whether the court has jurisdiction or the state has jurisdiction, but whether the courts
are to apply the applicable jurisdictional law if it is the international law of jurisdiction.
If the Court has in fact confused the jurisdiction of the state with the jurisdiction of the
Court, it would not be the first to do so. Although Ex parte Lopez, 6 F . Supp. 342 (S.D. Tex.
1934), is distinguishable from Alvarez-Machain, see infra note 112, as jurisdiction in Lopez is
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B. International Jurisdictional Law as the Source o f the States' Jurisdictional
Law To Be Applied in United States Courts
The central premise of this article is that international jurisdictional law,
and not the United States Constitution, is the proper source that grants jurisdiction to the United States. When concerned with the allocation of territorial jurisdiction between sovereigns, international law and the Constitution
are both coherently fashioned from the common paradigm underlying the
state system.62 Implicit in this paradigm is the idea that the distribution of
power between nations emanates from international law and the distribution
of power between entities within nations emanates from domestic law. Only
when seen in this light does each type of jurisdictional law, within the global
system of jurisdiction, perform a coherent symmetrical function. International law allocates authority between nation-states. The United States Constitution, as an internal document of the United States, allocates authority
among the fifty states.63 Contrary to this premise, Alvarez-Machain implies
that the domestic laws of the various nations redundantly attempt to allocate
the international distribution of authority unilaterally, while leaving the
clearly existing international law of jurisdiction no role to play. To accept
that this paradigm applies internationally is only to presume that the basic
organizational theory axiom-that
institutional coherence demands that
structures and rules necessary for allocating authority between units of coearguably legal under international law, the Lopez court appears to distinguish between the jurisdiction of the court and the jurisdiction of the state: "The intervention of the government of
Mexico raises serious questions, involving the claimed violation of its sovereignty, which may
well be presented to the Executive Department of the United States, but of which this court has
no jurisdiction." L o p e z , 6 F. Supp. at 344; see also Andrew B. Campbell, The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine: A Jurisdictional Weapon in the War on Drugs, 23 VAND.J . TRANSNAT'L
L. 385, 407-22
(1990) (reviewing case law suggesting power of government to seize foreign citizens separate
from jurisdiction of court); D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the
United States: Issues of International and Domestic L a w , 23 T E X .INT'L L.J. 1, 39-49 (1988)
(differentiating between jurisdiction of United States government and its courts); Malvina
Halberstam, In Defense of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'LL.
736, 744-45 (1992) (analyzing acts of United States government separate from jurisdiction of
court); Peter McCarthy, Comment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Extending the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine To Meet the Modern Challenges Posed by the International Drug Trade, 27 N E W
ENG. L. REV.1067, 1076-92 (1993) (discussing rights of United States under extradition treaty as
separate from jurisdiction of court); Darin Bifani, Comment, The Tension Between Policy Objectives and Individual Rights: Rethinking Extradition and Extraterritorial Abduction Jurisprudence,
41 BUFF.L. REV.627,678-95 (1993) (treating jurisdiction of court separate from right of government to seize defendants); William Birkett, Comment, Cracks in the Foundation of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement-A
Challenge to Basic Judicial Doctrines, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 599, 621-22
(1991) (suggesting courts should divest themselves of jurisdiction over abducted individuals to
prevent government transgressions).
62. See supra notes 22-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of this paradigm.
63. In addition, the Constitution could act as a supplemental long-arm-like self-limit on the
jurisdiction of the United States beyond that called for by international law. See supra note 53
for a definition of "long arm statute."
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qua1 status be developed at a level which transcends that of any individual
unit-applies
to the international order.64
Specific evidence that international law is the source of a state's jurisdiction is found in the formulation of the international jurisdictional law regarding abductions in particular. The explicit requirement that an illegally
abducted defendant be returned to the state of capture65 implies that it is not
only illegal for a foreign state to abduct a defendant from another state
(which could be remedied by any one of a variety of international sanct i o n ~ ~but
~ ) also
,
that the abducting state does not have jurisdiction to exercise authority over the defendant.
Written by drafters who implicitly assumed the paradigm, the United
States Constitution implies a similar u n d e r ~ t a n d i n g . ~
As
~ a document
designed to provide a framework for the internal governance of the United
States and not the global community, the Constitution does not purport to
allocate power among the nation-states of the global community, but only
among the fifty states of the Union and between those fifty states and the
64. Max Weber gives one of the classic descriptions of this axiom:
The principles of o f i c e hierarchy and of channels of appeal . . . stipulate a clearly
established system of super- and subordination in which there is a supervision of the
lower offices by the higher ones. Such a system offers the governed the possibility of
appealing, in a precisely regulated manner, the decision of a lower office t o the corresponding superior authority. With the full development of the bureaucratic type, the
office hierarchy is monocratically organized. The principle of hierarchical office authority is found in all bureaucratic structures: in state and ecclesiastical structures as
well as in large party organizations and private enterprises. It does not matter for the
character of bureaucracy whether its authority is called "private" o r "public."
When the principle of jurisdictional "competency" is fully carried through, hierarchical subordination-at
least in public office-does
not mean that the "higher" authority is authorized simply to take over the business of the "lower." Indeed, the
opposite is the rule; once an office has been set up, a new incumbent will always be
appointed if a vacancy occurs.
3 MAX WEBER,supra note 16, at 957 (emphasis in original); see also MOORE,A M A MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK
§ 1 (1970) (emphasizing that establishing hierarchy of "authority, power, decision making and administering" is essential to achievement of organizational goals; asserting
that, whether delegation of authority results in decentralized o r centralized formal structure,
central source for guidance and authority is required for "organizational coherence and to avoid
30-54 (1946)
organizational chaos"); PETER DRUCKER,THECONCEIT OF THE ORGANIZATION
(maintaining that central authority, which defines delegation of power and corresponding role of
constituent units in any centralized or decentralized organizational structure, is vital t o administrative efficiency and to long-term survival of institution).
65. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
66. For example, possibilities could include formal censure through resolutions of international organizations o r limited economic sanctions.
67. O n e legal scholar, emphasizing that the framers of the Constitution were extremely
well-schooled in international law, has described the Constitution as a charter of authority, allocating jurisdiction between the different branches of the distinct national and state authorities in
order to achieve, in part, the essential constitutional objective of paving a "way t o nationhood'one nation firmly hooped together' with respect t o everything external." Edwin D. Dickinson,
T h e L a w of Nations as Part o f the National Law o f the United States, 101 U . PA. L. REV. 26, 45
(1952) (citation omitted).
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federal government. The Preamble to the Constitution makes clear that it is
"[wle the People of the United States," who are attempting to form (obviously between the states within the United States) "a more perfect Union,"
and that "this Constitution for the United States of America" was "ordain[ed]
and establish[edIwto "establish Justice [presumably within the American system], insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
P o ~ t e r i t y . "The
~ ~ specific articles of the Constitution, true to the document's
intention, provide for the internal allocation of authority within the United
States and not within the international community. For example, it is clear,
from the context of Article 111's identification of the limited subject matter
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other federal courts to be established,
that Article 111 provides an alternative to state court jurisdiction, and is not
intended to allocate authority between the United States and foreign
courts.69 Likewise, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV requires
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."70 Thus, the Constitution establishes once again the deference that the fifty states within the
Union owe to each other. Nowhere does the Constitution impose similar
obligations upon the nation-states of the worlde71 These obligations, it is

68. U.S. CONST.pmbl. (emphasis added). Without the benefit of my editing, the original
reads:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Id.
69. According to Article 111, the judicial power of the national authority was to "be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish." U.S. CONST.art. 111, 5 1. Article 111, Section 2 enumerates specific areas of
subject matter jurisdiction for the exercise of the national, as opposed to state, judicial power.
U.S. CONST.art. 111, 9 2. Alexander Hamilton specifically addressed the way in which judicial
authority t o resolve disputes with foreign implications should be allocated between American
courts:
"The union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members. . . . So great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties involve
national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those in
which they are concerned to the national tribunals."

THEFEDERALIST
NO. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
70. U.S. CONST.art. IV, 9 1.
71. It is well-established that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution applies
only between states of the United States. The satisfaction of judgments between courts of different nation-states is determined in accordance with international principles of comity. See Arthur
von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a
Suggested Approach, 81 HARV.L. REV. 1601, 1607 (1968) (discussing inherent differences between American and international practice); cf. Joel R. Paul, Comity in International L a w , 32
HARV.INT'LL.J. 1 (1991) (exploring meanings and origins of comity in international law).
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well-established, are within the province of international law and not the
United States C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~
72. Canons of American legal construction provide additional support for not reading the
Constitution to prescribe the grant of personal jurisdiction t o the United States. Such canons
hold that, unless indicating to the contrary, United States law should be interpreted as consistent
with international law. In an often-cited opinion, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains . . . ." Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(THIRD),supra note 9, 5 114.
(1804). Additional support is found in the RESTATEMENT
("Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with
international law or with an international agreement of the United States."). See also i d . 9 401
cmt. b (observing that domestic law generally construed t o avoid conflict with international law).
While this rule generally applies to statutes, logically the Constitution should likewise be construed as consistent with international law, unless it similarly indicates to the contrary.
One application of these interpretive rules is that American law should not be construed as
attempting t o legislate within the prescriptive domain rendered by international law t o other
nation-states. International law under the paradigm legitimately circumscribes the allocation of
personal jurisdiction to nation-states, while the Constitution does not indicate an intention to
prescribe the allocation of personal jurisdiction to the United States. (The Constitution makes
no explicit reference to personal jurisdiction and in fact only makes reference to the relationship
of the judicial arms of the various states to each other directly in the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, U.S. CONST.art. IV.) In accordance with these canons of construction, therefore, the
Constitution should not be interpreted as intending to prescribe the allocation of personal jurisdiction between the United States and Mexico.
Another application is that the Constitution would be usurping international law's substantive limitation on the proper means of ascertaining jurisdiction over offshore defendants to the
extent that the Court's acceptance of jurisdiction implied that the constitutional grant of personal jurisdiction to the United States was broader than that allowed by international law. The
Charming Betsy case is commonly cited to invoke international norms of comity or abstention in
controversies regarding the extraterritorial reach of domestic statutes. See, e.g., McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,21 (1963) (holding that jurisdictional
provisions of National Labor Relations Act must be interpreted consistent with "well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs
of a ship"). For a discussion of the Charming Betsy principle as providing, in part, a "jurisdictional imperative" by requiring a specialized rationale for the rebuttable presumption that all
legislation is territorial, see Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 V A N DL.
. REV. 1103, 1144, 1197 (1990) (maintaining that
Charming Betsy principle should take on "heightened practical and theoretical significance"; for
example, offering "an affirmative warrant for applying the substantive international standards in
the construction of domestic statutes" in light of contemporary international legal developments
and rise of statutes in domestic law).
While canons of construction can be helpful in reinforcing our interpretation of the Constitution as consistent with this paradigm, courts should not attempt to ascertain this law by conducting an exercise in constitutional interpretation. Because the understanding of personal
jurisdiction informing both the Constitution and international law similarly conforms to a paradigm which sees international law as the source of the grant of jurisdiction to the United States,
courts might correctly conclude that the same international doctrine would result by either looking directly to international law or by interpreting the intention of the Constitution. However, a
clear implication of the paradigm is that since the United States cannot generate its own jurisdiction, it follows that it would be ultra vires for United States law, even constitutional law, to
attempt to prescribe the international parameters of its jurisdiction t o adjudicate. It would,
therefore, be improper under the paradigm for courts to attempt to ascertain this law by conducting an exercise in constitutional interpretation.
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This understanding of the respective functions of domestic and international law can also be seen in the pre-minimum contacts American judicial
doctrine of civil jurisdiction which, like the aspect of the modern law of criminal jurisdiction that I am addressing, was designed to allocate territorial authority between sovereigns and not to protect the rights of defendant^.^^
Justice Field wrote the Supreme Court's classic decision in Pennoyer v. N e f f 4
at a time when personal jurisdiction in civil cases was primarily viewed as
allocating such territorial authority to sovereign^.^^ The Pennoyer decision
clearly implies an acceptance of the paradigm that the jurisdiction of the
United States emanates from international law. Justice Field's approach to
articulating the American requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction
over a defendant was to analogize the "well-established principles of public
law respecting the jurisdiction of an independent State over persons and
property" to the American internal system created under our C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~
The Justice wrote:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect
independent, many of the rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government created by the
Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instru73. For distinguished commentary discussing the early territorial principles underlying the
law of personal jurisdiction, see Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 257-74 (1990) ('jurisdiction necessary to maintain state sovereignty in
applying Full Faith and Credit provision); Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of
Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH.L. REV. 849, 871-76 (1989) (federal common-law rules of
jurisdiction based on territorial rules); James Weinstein, The Early American Origins of Territoriality in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 ST. LOUISU. L.J. 1, 27-32 (1992) (jurisdiction of court necessary
to give effect to Full Faith and Credit provision of Constitution). But see Albert A. Ehrenzweig,
The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289, 303-08 (1956) (questioning extent to which territorial approach to jurisdiction was ever
actually accepted); Hazard, supra note 26, at 245-62 (source of territorial rule found in Pennoyer
was fiction invented by Joseph Story in 1834).
74. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
75. Id. at 732-36. This concern with the allocation of sovereign authority was a legacy of
medieval legal concepts drawn from English common law. In order for the courts to assert
jurisdiction over civil defendants in the early days of the common law, such defendants, like
criminal defendants today, had to be present before the court. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The presence of the defendant was required to ensure that the Court could enforce a
potential judgment against him as well as to ensure the proper functioning of what were called
"trials by ordeal." ROBERTC. CASAD,JURISDICTION
IN CIVILACTIONS5 2.02(2)(a), at 2-12-13
(1991) (posting bond in amount that would cover any anticipated judgment would release defendant). To gain the defendant's presence, many civil lawsuits began with the actual arrest of
the defendant under what was called, "a writ of capias ad respondendum." Id. The need for
such arrests had the same potential for conflicts with other sovereigns that exist today in criminal
jurisdiction. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. While the presence of the defendant was
no longer required by the time of Pennoyer, and arrest had, therefore, given way to service of
process, courts had not yet changed their method of analysis. See generally 3 W.S. HOLDSWORTH,A HISTORYOF ENGLISHLAW ch. VI (1923) (discussing evolution of procedure and
pleading, including process, in English criminal and civil law); Hazard, supra 26, at 252-58 (documenting effect of early English common law on American law of jurisdiction).
76. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
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ment, they possess and exercise the authority of independent States,
and the principles of public law to which we have referred are applicable to them. One of these principles is, that every State possesses
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its t e r r i t ~ r y . ' ~
By analogizing the United States' internal constitutional scheme to the
international system, the Pennoyer Court acknowledged the existence of separate preexisting international "public law" rules of jurisdiction between
nation-states, and further, that the federal scheme under the Constitution is
modeled on principles of interstate relations. Not only did Justice Field assume the continued validity of the international rules under our American
system, but it would be illogical to reason that the philosophical underpinnings of this system conflicted with the very international order from which it
drew its i n s p i r a t i ~ n . ~ ~
77. Id. The passage goes on to say:
As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the civil status and
capacities of its inhabitants; to prescribe the subjects upon which they may contract, the
forms and solemnities with which their contracts shall be executed, the rights and obligations arising from them, and the mode in which their validity shall be determined and
their obligations enforced; and also to regulate the manner and conditions upon which
property situated within such territory, both personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed, and transferred. The other principle of public law referred to follows from the
one mentioned; that is, that no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over
persons or property without its territory. The several states are of equal dignity and
authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power-from all others.
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State
have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that
no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject
either persons or property to its decisions.
Id. (citations omitted).
78. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 732-36. Pennoyer is the most famous of the many cases of the time
which, through such analogous reasoning, implied the validity of the international law of jurisdiction within our system. In D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S (11 How.) 165 (1850), the Supreme Court
refused t o enforce a sister state judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause by analogizing
the domestic law of jurisdiction to the international law of jurisdiction. D'Arcy, 52 U.S. at 17576. The Court proclaimed: "We deem it to be free from controversy that these adjudications are
in conformity to the well-established rules of international law, regulating governments foreign
to each other . . . ." Id. at 174; see also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839)
(analogizing American states to nations for jurisdictional purposes); Peckham v. North Parish, 33
Mass. (16 Pick.) 274, 286 (1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609, 611-13 (C.C. Mass. 1828) (No.
11,134); M'Queen v. Middletown Mfg. Co., 16 Johns. 4, 7 (N.Y. 1819); Mali v. Keeper of the
Common Jail (Waldenhus's Case), 120 U.S. 1 (1887); Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1786); Phelps v. Holker, 1 Dall. 281, 284 (Pa. 1788); Campbell v. Wilson, 6 Tex. 379, 391
(1851); see also Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. CHI.L. &v. 775,
782-84 nn.23 & 28-31 (1955) (discussing cases addressing territorial limits on judicial power in
reference to judgments, on state power to grant divorces, on state power to tax, and on state
power to legislate).
Patrick Borchers recently canvassed the early personal jurisdiction cases in support of the
argument that "the Court did not intend to transform the substance of personal jurisdiction into
a matter of constitutional law," and concluded that courts prior to ~enn&er consistently applied
the international territorial principles of personal jurisdiction. Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of
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Having now seen that the international order is the source which grants
jurisdiction to the United States and that this order does not permit abductions, we must logically conclude that the United States does not have jurisdiction over defendants brought to the United States by way of an abduction.

As the starting point for its analysis, the Alvarez-Machain Court asserted that if "the [United States-Mexican bilateral extradition] Treaty does
not prohibit respondent's abduction . . . the court need not inquire as to how
respondent came before it."79 Having framed the issue as such, the AlvarezMachain decision is ostensibly committed to arguing that the extradition
treaty, which it regards as the equivalent of a long arm statute,80 does not ban
abductions. If the Court correctly assumed that the United States' grant of
jurisdiction stems from the Constitution, which I have shown has been interpreted to allow jurisdiction in abduction cases between states of the union,s1
then it would have been logical for the Court to demonstrate that the extradition treaty did not "legislatively" restrict jurisdiction and ban abductions. If,
however, as I have demonstrated above, the source of the United States'
grant of jurisdiction stems from international law, a body of law which clearly
does not provide states with the original authority to assert such jurisdiction,
then merely demonstrating that the extradition treaty does not explicitly prohibit jurisdiction based on abductions would not be sufficient to permit such
an assertion of jurisdiction.
The Court, starting from the erroneous premise that international law is
not the proper source of the relevant jurisdictional law, could have attempted
to prove that jurisdiction based on abductions is permissible by openly acknowledging that it applied the United States Constitution as the relevant
source of legal authority for the United States' assertion of jurisdiction over
Dr. Alvarez-Machain, thereby ignoring the international legal context altogether. The Court then would have needed only to demonstrate that the
extradition treaty, acting as the equivalent of a long arm statute, did not explicitly ban abductions. The Court implicitly realized, however, that such a
the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
U.C. DAVISL. REV. 19, 25-32 (1990). John Drobak similarly canvassed personal jurisdiction
cases prior to Pennoyer, and concluded that
[ulnder the principles of international law as understood by these American courts, one
country did not have authority over the citizens of another unless they or their property
were within the borders of the country. The courts used this concept of governmental
territorial authority as the basis for rules of personal jurisdiction.
John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1022
(1983).
79. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992).
80. See supra text accompanying note 54.
81. See supra text accompanying notes 41-49.
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demonstration would have been a meaningless interpretation of the extradition treaty because the treaty was not negotiated within the context of the
American constitutional system of jurisdiction. The parties rather negotiated
it with the understanding that it was an international instrument whose terms
were to be interpreted within the context of the international system. The
Court could, therefore, only reach its conclusion that the United States had
jurisdiction over Dr. Alvarez-Machain by creating and applying its own international jurisdictional legal order which conforms to the permissive constitutional one. The Court accomplished this convoluted reasoning by using the
extradition treaty both as a vehicle to marginalize the international law of
jurisdiction, and then as a means of replacing that law with its own international jurisdictional order that permits abductions.
In reality, the United States-Mexico bilateral extradition treaty,
although operating within the context of the international jurisdictional system, has nothing to do with abductions. Implicit in the territorial grant of
jurisdiction to states is the legal right to exercise unilateral discretion in deciding whether to honor a foreign nation's request to turn over resident fugitives. While the Alvarez-Machain Court is heir to a long line of confusion
surrounding the role of extradition treaties in abduction cases,82 extradition
treaties only provide a mechanism by which states may mutually agree to
82. While the Supreme Court had never before held that international jurisdictional law
should be disregarded, see infra notes 107-38 and accompanying text, the prevailing belief among
commentators and courts, including those who have refused to assert jurisdiction over abducted
defendants, see infra note 112, has been that extradition treaties are relevant to determining the
legality of abductions. The seeds of this confusion were planted by the method of analysis employed by the Supreme Court in its first American overseas abduction decision, Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436 (1886). In Ker, the Court did not directly apply international jurisdictional law but,
because of factors unique to the time and manner in which that case was argued, felt itself forced
to derive the controlling jurisdictional law from an extradition treaty. See infra notes 116-26 and
accompanying text for an explanation of the Ker Court's analysis. Following Ker, courts have
attempted to derive jurisdictional law from extradition treaties.
When Ker was decided in 1886, customary international law was thought to be incorporated
into state common law. Consequently, the Supreme Court considered a determination of international law by a state court to be a question of state law, not subject to review or independent
determination by the Supreme Court. Customary international law operating as domestic law of
the United States only came to be regarded as exclusively incorporated in federal law in the
middle of this century. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964)
(Supreme Court implying for the first time that customary international law is federal law and its
determination by federal courts is binding on state courts); RESTATEMENT(THIRD),supra note
9, 5 111 (1)-(2) cmts. d-f, reporters' note 3; see aLso Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in
the United States, 82 MICH.L. REV.1555, 1559 (1984) (observing that, prior to Sabbatino, state
determinations of customary international law were not reviewed by Supreme Court). The
Court considered the international law of jurisdiction to be customary international law and,
since international jurisdictional law had not been argued in state court, the Ker Court believed
it could not independently apply this law. It stated:
[Tlhe decision of [whether international jurisdictional law prohibits jurisdiction] is as
much within the province of the State court, as a question of common law, or of the law
of nations, of which that court is bound to take notice, as it is of the courts of the
United States. And though we might or might not differ with the Illinois court of that
subject, it is one in which we have no right to review their decision.
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waives3 a part of that discretion and obligate themselves to turn over certain
classes of defendants in the event of requests for e x t r a d i t i ~ n .Extradition
~~
Ker, 119 U.S. at 444; see Charles Fairman, Ker v. Illinois Revisited, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 683
(Supp. 1953) (pointing out that Ker Court limited t o reviewing original treaty claim made in state
court).
83. Because in theory it is in furtherance of the rights of states that international law provides for exclusive territorial jurisdiction, as Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange specifies, international law allows for exceptions to this exclusivity, "traced up to the consent of the
nation itself." The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). This
principle of state consent not only allows for states t o prospectively waive, to the extent specified
in an extradition treaty, their sovereign right not t o extradite defendants, but also is currently
presumed to allow for states to assert jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign states,
provided the foreign state does not retroactively object. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
84. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933), which states:
[Tlhe principles of international law recognize no right to extradition apart from
treaty. . . . [Tlhe legal right t o demand [a fugitive's] extradition and the correlative duty
to surrender him t o the demanding country exist only when created by treaty. To determine the nature and extent of the right we must look t o the treaty which created it.
Factor, 290 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted); see also Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304, 306 (11th Cir.
1987) ("Under international law, as recognized in the United States, any nation has the right not
t o surrender fugitives, but instead to grant asylum. The function of extradition treaties is to
create exceptions to this right of other nations."); accord United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
939 F.2d 1341, 1356 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 2986 (1992)
(Court stated, in case arising out of the same events as Alvarez-Machain, where defendant was
also abducted from Mexico, that "a kidnapping is a flagrant treaty violation because it wholly
circumvents the extradition process, and with it the commitment of the United States to follow
the rule of law in its international relations.") (case was vacated as a result of the AlvarezMachain decision); Valentine v. United States ex re1 Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 , 14 n.12 (1936)
(" 'The treaty between the United States and Mexico creates an obligation o n the part of the
respective governments, and does no more, and where the obligation ceases the power fails. . . .
It would be a great evil that those guilty of high crime, whether American citizens or not, should
go unpunished; but even that result could not justify a usurpation of power.' ") (citation
omitted).
That general international jurisdictional law and extradition treaties function together in
this way is supported by extensive expert commentary. A s one prominent author explained:
In the case of extradition, the refugee is outside the territory of the State where the
offence has been committed. The State which decides o n the grant of territorial asylum, that is t o say, non-extradition, exercises its own territorial jurisdiction. In the absence of an extradition treaty, its discretion is unlimited. Even when an extradition
treaty with an exception clause regarding political crimes exists, such a clause is merely
a reservation of the freedom which, in the absence of a treaty, the territorial sovereign
would in any case be able to exercise.
1 GEORGSCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW257 (3d ed. 1957); see also IANBROWNLIE,
OF PUBLICINTERNATIONAL
LAW ch. XV (1966) (discussing in this chapter, titled
PRINCIPLES
"Reservations From Territorial Sovereignty," treaties as a "privilege and license granted by territorial sovereigns . . . [and as] waivers of jurisdiction . . . [and explaining that] the basis for such
competence can only be by the invitation and consent of the territorial sovereign."); I OPPENHEIM, supra note 26, § 169, at 564 ("No other state may exercise its power within the boundaries
of the home territory; however, international law does, and international treaties may, restrict
&
the territorial sovereign in the exercise of its sovereignty . . . ."); GEORGSCHWARZENBERGER
E.D. BROWN,A MANUALOF INTERNATIONAL
LAW91 (6th ed. 1976) ("[I]nternational law may
lead t o a limitation of territorial jurisdiction . . . as practiced o n the basis of treaties . . . Extradi-
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treaties neither ban nor permit abductions since they d o not play a role in
determining the preexisting obligation of states to respect the territorial sovereignty of foreign states.85 Therefore, as one would expect and as the Court
acknowledges, the United States-Mexico bilateral extradition treaty "says
nothing about the obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain
from forcible abductions of people from the territory of the other nation, or
the consequences under the treaty if such an abduction occurs."86 The Court,
however, in concluding that abductions are allowed, draws the wrong conclusion from the treaty's silence.
The Court, under the pretense of interpreting the extradition treaty,
merely used it to imply a general jurisdictional framework which permits the
United States to maintain jurisdiction over an abductee. The Court bolstered
its conclusion by claiming to have looked to the treaty's "history of negotiation and practice."s7 The Court's first step was to portray the international
law of jurisdiction as irrelevant to the issue at hand. While the Court vaguely
admitted that the abduction may have been in "violation of general international law principle^,"^^ it failed not only to explain the ultimate relevance of
this law but also to mention its specific ban on abductions. Under the pretense that the only relevant issue the Court needed to address was whether
the extradition treaty bans abductions, the Court illogically used the fact that
the extradition treaty does not explicitly ban abductions to establish that intion treaties . . . allow contracting parties t o demand the surrender of a suspected o r convicted
criminal from another State in which he has taken refuge.").
O n e academic study specifically found that this principle provided a unifying theme in extradition cases. The author stated:
The chief policy underlying these decisions interpreting extradition treaties, appears t o
be that since the principle of the treaties represents a notable departure from the exclusive jurisdiction exercised by each party to the treaty over individuals found within its
borders, a greater surrender of exclusive jurisdiction than provided by the treaty ought
not to be sanctioned by the decision of a court when lawless actions have occurred.
Thomas Sponsler, International Kidnapping, 5 INT'L LAW.27, 33 (1971).
85. Both international jurisdictional law and extradition treaties, however, perform in tandem to meet the dual systemic goals of securing the primacy of territorial jurisdiction while
providing an organized mechanism to assure the ability of states to secure the presence of certain
wanted fugitives. See CHARLES
G. FENWICK,
INTERNATIONAL
LAW237-45 (3d ed. 1934) (noting
that under prevailing strict view of state sovereignty common interest in maintenance of the law
has led t o development of extradition treaties); see also Research in International Law, Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J . INT'L L. 21, 38-40 (Supp. 1935) (contending that extradition treaties provide lawful means for international cooperation in suppression of crime, given current
lack of unified global system of criminal law).
86. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992). Because the defendant
was a Mexican national, the Court specifically focuses o n article 9 of the treaty which stated that
the parties were not required to extradite their own nationals. Id. (citing Treaty of Extradition,
May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., art. 9, 31 U.S.T. 5059, 5065). If a requested party did in fact choose not
t o extradite a national, and that party had jurisdiction, it was required to prosecute the national
itself. Id.
The Court found that article 9 did not specify the only way that one country may gain
custody over the nationals of the other country for the purposes of prosecution. Id. at 2194.
87. Id.
88. I d . at 2196.
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ternational jurisdiction law, which does ban abductions, is irrelevant. The
Court stated:
Respondent would have us find that the Treaty acts as a prohibition
against a violation of the general principle of international law that
one government may not "exercise its police power in the territory
of another state." There are many actions which could be taken by
a nation that would violate this principle, including waging war, but
it cannot seriously be contended an invasion of the United States by
Mexico would violate the terms of the extradition treaty between
the two nations.89
Having disregarded the significance of the international law of jurisdiction, the Court, by misinterpreting the meaning of two independent legal developments, created a new international jurisdictional order that permits
jurisdiction over abducted defendants. The Court accomplished this by interpreting one of these developments as creating and the other as implying an
overall international jurisdictional order consistent with allowing for abductions. The Court then argued that abductions must be allowed because the
extradition treaty operating within this order does not explicitly ban them.
The Court first pointed to its 1886 decision, Ker v. I l l i n o i ~ which
, ~ ~ it
interpreted as creating a rule that American courts will always accept jurisdiction over abducted defendank91 The Court inferred from this an international jurisdictional framework that permits jurisdiction over abductees
between the United States and Mexico. The Court argued that because the
Mexican government did not negotiate a ban on abductions in a subsequent
version of the extradition treaty, the treaty permits jurisdiction. The Court
further implied the existence of a jurisdictional framework that permits the
assertion of jurisdiction over abductees by arguing that the treaty's drafters
ultimately rejected language proposed by a Harvard research team which
would have prohibited the assertion of jurisdiction over a b d ~ c t e e s .Be~~
cause "no such clause appears in the current treaty," the Court argued that
the treaty must permit jurisdiction over abducted defendant^.^^
89. Id. (citations omitted). The Court also claimed that "[rlespondent does not argue that
[international jurisdictional law or the U.N. or O.A.S. charters] provide an independent basis for
the right . . . not to be tried in the United States." Id. at 2195. It is unclear, however, whether the
Court believed that the defendant's failure to make the argument relieved the court of the burden of considering the applicability of international law. Regardless of who should make the
argument, the fact that international law independently prohibits jurisdiction in this case cannot
be denied.
90. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
91. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194. The Ker decision did not actually hold that American courts may accept jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international law.
See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of Ker.
92. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194 (referring to that "prominent group of legal scholars sponsored by the faculty of Harvard Law School"); see Research in International Law, supra
note 40, at 623. For text of clause, see supra note 40 and infra note 93.
93. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2194-95. In article 16 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, the Harvard Research in International Law proposed:
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The Court misinterpreted the meaning of both the Ker decision and the
language prohibiting jurisdictions over abductees. First, as will be demonstrated in Part VII, the Ker decision did not hold that American courts could
assert jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international jurisdictional law. Second, the language that prohibits jurisdiction over
abductees cannot reasonably be interpreted to imply that international law
permits abductions. The Harvard research proposal did not attempt to suggest language for inclusion in extradition treaties so that they might reverse a
generally permissive international rule. Instead, the proposal attempted to
suggest language for use in a proposed multilateral convention codifying the
existing international prohibition on abduction^.^^
Even if the Court did not misinterpret the Ker decision and the Harvard
proposal, these two isolated legal sources could not reasonably supplant the
international law of jurisdiction. As I have demonstrated, the international
law of jurisdiction is inherent in the very international paradigm upon which
the international state system is basedeg5
VI. THEDUALISTMODELDOES NOT PERMITDOMESTICCOURTSTO
GIVEDEFERENCE
TO AMERICAN
VIOLATIONS
OF THE
~ N T E R N A T ~ O N ALAW
L
OF JURISDICTION

Even having assumed that the United States Constitution is the proper
legal source that grants jurisdiction to the United States, the Court must contend with the fact that the international law of jurisdiction, which clearly prohibits abductions without foreign consent, still exists. To justify disregarding
the international law of jurisdiction, the Court's decision, therefore, implies
reliance on what is called the "dualist" understanding of the relationship between international law and domestic law. The dualist model of this relationship, which the American judiciary has adopted, posits that domestic and
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or punish any
person who has been brought within its temtory or a place subject to its authority by
recourse to measures in violation of international law or international convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by
such measures.
DRAFTCONVENTION
JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT
TO CRIME
art. 16, printed in 29 AM.J . INT'L
L. 437, 442 (Supp. 1935).
94. Research in International Law, supra note 40, at 445 (Comment).
95. Even if the Court was correct in its interpretation of these developments, and even if
international jurisdictional law was not so fundamental to the international system, these developments would have, on their own terms, provided scant support for the existence of a positive
rule of international law allowing abductions. The Harvard research would have at best been
only implicit evidence of a generally permissive rule regarding abductions. It would not have
created a law of its own.
In regard to Ker, even assuming that the Alvarez-Machain Court was correct in its analysis,
and that Ker held that if the United States chose to engage in abductions, United States courts
would accept jurisdiction over defendants abducted in violation of international law, one domestic decision would not constitute state practice sufficient to create a customary or special customary rule preempting the general prohibition on abductions. See infra note 97 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the law-making implications of state practice.
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international legal systems are completely separate and distinct.96 As distinct
systems, they each have their own sources of law and their own separate lawapplying institutions. Emanating from the international system, international
law is mostly created by nation-states through procedures which manifest
their consent to be legally bound either explicitly through treaties or implicitly through customary practice.97 Domestic law, on the other hand, emanates from an individual nation-state's domestic system. Legislatures,
administrative agencies, and tribunals, for example, serve as law-making bodies in the American domestic system. International legal disputes are largely
resolved through international dispute resolution mechanisms such as diplomacy, international arbitration, or the International Court of Justice. Domestic legal disputes are resolved within the legal bodies of the particular
nation-states, most notably domestic courts.
The seamless nature of law, however, often necessitates that domestic
courts interpret and apply international law despite this theoretically strict
separation between the domestic and international legal systems. In the
United States, for example, this is accomplished consistently with the dualist
model by incorporating international law into federal law.98 This convoluted
approach permits the United States to break international law by employing
96. The doctrine of dualism is one of two accepted analytical approaches that have evolved
in an attempt to explain the interaction between international law and the domestic legal order
coherently. Unlike the doctrine of monism, which contemplates a single legal order based on a
hierarchy of legal norms comprised of both international and domestic law, dualism is premised
on the fact that the international and domestic legal orders are distinct. The monist-dualist distinction impacts upon when a domestic court is required, as opposed to merely permitted, to give
legal effect to international obligations. See generally LOUISHENKINET AL., INTERNATIONAL
153-54 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the monist-dualist debate); Louis
LAWCASESA N D MATERIALS
Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its
Progeny, 100 HARV.L. REV.853, 864-66 (1987) (explaining monist and dualist doctrines). See
also J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L.
66, 68 (theoretical treatment of the relationship between international and municipal law).
97. Positivist doctrine classically holds that the international legal order is based primarily
on the principle of the consent of states. "It followed logically f r o m . . . sovereignty that, if the
states were to be subject to law, that law must emanate from the states themselves. Since states
were sovereign and independent they could be bound only with their consent." John P.
Humphrey, O n the Foundations of International L a w , 39 AM. J . INT'LL. 231, 233 (1945). The
primary way in which states manifest their consent is through treaties. Id. at 234.
States are also thought to manifest their consent through state practice. "Customary international law results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),supra note 9, § 102(2); see also id. § 102 cmts.
b, c & reporters' notes 2 (explaining opinio juris and further defining way in which state practice
becomes customary international law); P.E. Corbett, Fundamentals of a New Law of Nations, 1
U. TORONTOL.J. 3, 15 (1935-1936) (suggesting more modern view of international law that
recognizes norms of global law as imposing duties). Customary practice as so conceived refers to
"law that is 'legislated' through the political actions of the governments of the world's States."
Henkin, supra note 82, at 1562.
98. But not all international law is incorporated into United States law. Only customary
international law, as well as treaties and other international legal instruments that are specifically appropriate for application by domestic courts, are deemed to be incorporated. All other
international law is limited to application by state parties in international fora.
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the "later-in-time rule." Since the most recent enactments of federal law
take precedence, the courts are required to recognize the most recent federal
law as authoritative even if such federal law is preceded by an international
legal o b l i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~
International agreements and international law are incorporated into United States law in
the following manner:
Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
international agreements of the United States, except that a "non-self-executing"
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.
. . . The proposition that international law and agreements are law in the United
States is addressed largely to the courts. In appropriate cases they apply international
law or agreements without the need of enactment by Congress or proclamation by the
President. Much customary law and many international agreements, however, do not
have the quality of law for the courts in that they do not regulate activities, relations, or
interests in the United States. . . .
....
. . .[T]he intention of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be
self-executing in the United States or should await implementation by legislation or
appropriate executive or administrative action.
RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),
supra note 9, $ 111 (3) & cmt. c.
99. The "later-in-time" rule is established by the weight of authority. "An act of Congress
and a self-executing treaty of the United States are of equal status in United States law, and in
(THIRD),
supra note 9, $ 115
case of inconsistency the later in time prevails." RESTATEMENT
cmt. a. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution has been read to support the
equal status of treaties and statutes and the later-in-time rule. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) ("By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the
supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to either over the other. When the two
relate to the same subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but, if the two are inconsistent,
the one last in date will control the other. . . .") The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution
provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any TZhing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2. This Clause does not establish the relationship between treaties, international customary law, and statutes. It only addresses the relationship between treaties and
state law. It is accepted, however, that customary law is, like treaty law, international law and,
therefore, both are indistinguishable in status from self-executing treaties. In The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Court decided that "[ilnternational law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often
as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. Consequently, customary international law is part of the law of the
United States. Accord RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),
supra note 9 , 5 111 & cmts. c-e & reporters'
notes 4 (stating that issues of customary law "arise under the laws of the United States" for
purposes of jurisdiction of federal courts); cf. Henkin, supra note 82, at 1562-64 (customary
international law should be given authority equal t o United States federal law); Jules Lobel, The
Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International L a w , 71 V A .
L. REV. 1071, 1100-14 (1985) (explaining that subsequent federal statute could supersede
custom).
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This understanding has at times been extended in American doctrine to
allow the President, acting on his own authority, to violate international
law.loO Noted commentators, such as Louis Henkin, have extensively and
persuasively criticized this executive power. They feel this executive power
contradicts the theory that international law is the law of the United States
since the President is obligated under Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."lol Such commentators
argue that since we are a nation of laws, the executive branch should not be
able to act in violation of international law, when it functions as the law of
the United States, anymore than the executive branch can act in violation of
purely domestic law.lo2
The argument that judicial deference to executive violations of international law under the dualist theory violates American constitutional principles is persuasive. Such deference is, however, consistent with the more
fundamental dualist notion that domestic courts can be directed to follow
domestic sources of law rather than international sources of law.lo3
100. This authority has been read into the Supreme Court's dictum that courts will give
effect t o international law "where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). See infra note 103
for a more detailed discussion of this case. See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD),
supra note 9, 5 115
reporters' note 3 (discussing presidential authority to supersede international law or agreement).
101. U.S. CONST.art. 11, 5 3.
[I]f we grant equal status to international law and United States statutes in our jurisprudence, it should follow that a constitutional act of Congress supersedes prior conflicting
international law. But surely the principle that international law has status equal t o
that of an act of Congress does not give the President authority to violate international
law. If the suggestion that an executive act may supersede international law is valid, it
must have special justification, and it must be carefully defined.
Unlike Congress, the President has n o general authority t o make law that might
compete with international law as law of the United States. The President's duty is to
'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' a duty that applies to international law
as well as to other law of the land.
Henkin, supra note 96, at 879 (citation omitted); see Lobel, supra note 99, at 1116-17 ("No
authoritative judicial precedent sanctions executive violations of international law.").
102. See Henkin, supra note 96, at 881-82 ("Only new international law or a new treaty will
repeal, or modify, a principle of customary law or terminate its status as law of the United States
and relieve the President of his duty to take care that it be faithfully executed."); see also Lobel,
supra note 99, at 1115 (proposing that a government of separated powers requires explicit congressional assent for deviations from international law).
103. Even under the constitutionally questionable dualist rule, that the President acting o n
his own authority can break international law, there is a serious question as to whether this
authority extends to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency. The major precedent
cited for the proposition that courts should give deference to executive violations of international law is The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In this case, a United States naval
commander ordered the arrest and capture, during the Spanish-American War, of two private
fishing boats located off the coast of Cuba and owned by a Spanish subject. The boats and their
cargo were sold, and the claimant sued for the proceeds of the sale. The Paquete Habana, 175
U.S. at 679. The customary international law of war allowed for nations to capture the ships of
belligerents during times of war, but prohibited the capture of small private coastal fishing boats.
In holding for the claimant that the capture of the fishing boat was illegal under our law, the
Supreme Court announced, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
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administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." Id. at 700. However, the Court
concluded that "[flor this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations. . . ." Id.
Courts have interpreted this language as supportive of the dualist proposition that deference should be given to a controlling executive act over international law. But what would
qualify as a "controlling executive act"? Obviously, in The Paquete Habana, the decision of a
naval commander was not a "controlling executive act." However, in 1986, United States Attorney General Edwin Meese ordered the detention of two groups of Cuban refugees that came to
the United States as part of the 1980 Marie1 boat lift. The first group consisted of Cuban
criminals and mental incompetents. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1448 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). The second group consisted of those for whom there was no evidence of criminal or mental defect. Id. The detention of both of these groups was challenged in
Garcia-Mir v. Meese. The court did not dispute the appellees' contention that general principles
of international law forbade prolonged, arbitrary detentions. Rather, the decision rested on the
authority of the Attorney General to violate this law. As to the first group, in accordance with
the dualist understanding that later-in-time legislation takes precedence over international law,
the court found that there had been "an affirmative legislative grant" of authority to detain. Id.
at 1453-54. As to the second group, the court concluded that there was no affirmative legislative
grant to detain, but found it legal, nonetheless, under the precedent established in The Paquete
Habana. Id. at 1454. The court concluded that the delegation of executive power to break
international law could be construed as delegated to the Attorney General. Id.
Since such authority could be construed as delegated to the Attorney General, could it also
be construed as delegated to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency? For a discussion of "when and how . . . the United States [may] violate international law," see Michael J.
Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 750, 753 (1992) (concluding that "[tlhere is in fact sound reason t o believe
that the President cannot, without congressional approval, place the United States in violation of
a widely accepted and clearly defined norm of customary international law of the sort that prohibits abduction").
Complicating this legal problem is that it is not factually clear whether the abduction was
authorized at a level higher or even lower than the Administrator of the DEA. Former legal
advisor to the Department of State, Abraham D. Sofaer, testified before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional rights concerning the kidnapping issue. In his testimony, given days after the Alvarez-Machain decision, Sofaer stated that those in "the State
Department were never consulted" about the capturing of Alvarez-Machain, and added that
they were "not even presented" with the idea. with regard to the usual chain of decision-making
in these kidnapping cases, Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld stated at the same hearing:
No one quite knows who approves these, whether they're done at the district agent
level of the Drug Enforcement Administration or at the local Border Patrol level.
When the inquiry starts, you get on the one hand deniability; the President himself
didn't know about it. On the other hand, you get the head of the Drug Enforcement
Administration or FBI saying; sure he was doing what I told him to do.
We will never know. Everybody lies in these cases, and the notion that there is
some sort of decision at high political level, that the President of the United States
makes this decision, is contrary, in my view, to the fact in these cases.
Kidnapping Subjects Abroad: Hearing Before the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1992) (Professor Andreas F. Lowenfeld); see also
Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run
Amok, 31 V A .J . INT'L L. 151, 165-66 (1991) (discussing fact that despite "strikingly different
versions of the facts . . . all explanations point t o a unilateral abduction by bounty hunters acting
at the behest of the DEA, with the approval of the Justice Department").
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The Alvarez-Machain Court implicitly relied upon the dualist model to
support its position that it could disregard the general principles of international law. The Court stated that "the decision of whether respondent should
be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the
Executive Branch."lm The Court elaborated in an explanatory footnote that
in the absence of a treaty violation, a "diplomatic approach," rather than a
"unilateral action by the courts of one nation," is the better method for redress of such violations.lo5 The position that the Court should give deference
to the "later-in-time" executive action, and that this deference should allow
the executive to resolve matters within the international system as the foreign
relations agent of the American state, is undoubtedly borrowed from the
jurisprudential doctrine which has established the dualist model in the
United States.
Based on the Court's tacit assumption that the Constitution is the source
of law which determines whether the United States can exercise jurisdiction
over a defendant abducted from a foreign nation, the Court's disregard of the
international law prohibiting abductions appears to be consistent with the
dualist model. However, once we correctly acknowledge international law as
the sole source of jurisdictional authority to nation-states, disregarding the
international law is no longer consistent with the dualist model.
The fact that the dualist model provides for two distinct systems of substantive law does not imply that it provides for two distinct jurisdictional systems. Rather, the model is based upon a unified global jurisdictional system.
The source of the state's basic grant of jurisdictional authority to create its
104. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992).
105. Id. at 2196 n.16. In this footnote, the Court relied on an historical example drawn from
the litigation in Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933), a case which was otherwise relevant
to the decision, see infra note 112. The facts leading up to this case evidenced a diplomatically
negotiated solution to a conflict between the United States and Britain, which transpired in the
context of the Supreme Court having interpreted American legislation in a way the British
thought violative of their sovereign rights under international law. During prohibition, British
ships entered American territorial waters to supply alcohol t o American distributors in violation
of prohibition laws. Having failed to negotiate a diplomatic solution with the British, in Cunard
S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1922), the United States argued that American prohibition laws
applied to, and could be enforced against, British ships operating within American territorial
waters. Cunard, 262 U.S. at 124. The British argued that under international law American
prohibition laws should not apply on board these ships because under international law they
should be considered a part of British territory and beyond the jurisdictional reach of American
legislation. Id. at 106-07. The Supreme Court held that international law allowed states to prescribe activities on board ships within their territorial waters and that it was Congress's intent
that American prohibition laws should apply to, and be enforced against, foreign ships operating
in American territorial waters. Id. at 128-29. Presumably, the relevance of this case is that, as in
Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court allowed the government to act against the interests of a
foreign country. The lesson evidently drawn from Cunard by the Alvarez-Machain Court is that,
freed to act without judicial impediment, the executive was able to successfully negotiate a mutually satisfactory treaty with Britain. The two cases differ, however, in that the decision in
Cztnard, allowing the United States to apply and enforce its laws against foreign ships within its
territorial waters, was most likely legal under international law, while the acceptance of jurisdiction in Alvarez-Machain was clearly illegal under international law.
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own substantive law-making system is, therefore, international law. While
the dualist model allows a nation-state to characterize substantive international law as domestic law for the purposes of applying the law domestically,
it does not allow a nation-state to characterize international jurisdictional law
in the same manner.lo6
OF AMERICAN
CASELAWWITH THE PARADIGM
VII. THECONSISTENCY
UNDERLYING
THE NATION-STATE
SYSTEM

Prior to the Alvarez-Machain decision, American abduction cases were
almost universally consistent with the nation-state paradigm. While the existence of the paradigm and its implications for jurisdictional law have been
independently demonstrated,lo7 such consistency of application is corroborative of the paradigm and its jurisdictional implications.
This is not to claim that the courts have been consciously aware that they
were applying the paradigm. In fact, there was a tremendous amount of confusion prior to the Alvarez-Machain decision. As I explained, courts and
commentators in civil cases have pervasively viewed the Constitution as the
source of the American state's grant of jurisdictional power.lo8 Some criminal courts have likewise failed to distinguish between the international abduction found in Ker v. Illinois and the domestic abduction found in Frisbie v.
Collins.lo9 Finally, following the Ker decision, courts and commentators
have in their confusion universally attempted to determine the legality of
abductions by way of interpreting extradition treaties.ll0 Indeed, one of the
contributions I hope to make in this article is to articulate the relevance of
this nation-state paradigm to personal jurisdiction in criminal cases. Nevertheless, because the paradigm forms the basis for our primary understanding
of the relationship of nation-states to the international order, it provides
either consciously or unconsciously the intellectual foundation upon which
such decisions are based. It is significant, therefore, that despite all this con106. Even if the state could create its own jurisdiction, the "executive" order authorizing
the kidnapping would have to be construed as not only authorizing a political action, but also as
intending to create new jurisdictional law.
If international law is the source of the state's jurisdiction, the only remedy for a violation of
such law is a denial of jurisdiction. The Court could not, consistent with the nature of jurisdiction, find that an abduction which violated the international law of jurisdiction could be remedied other than by refusing to assert personal jurisdiction. For example, simply punishing the
officials involved in the abduction or suggesting that the country whose sovereignty was offended
punish such officials would not remedy the jurisdictional infraction. See, e.g., Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503, 504-06 (5th Cir. 1934); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 18-21 (4th Cir. 1931).
In other words, the concern of a jurisdictional analysis, unlike the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, cannot be reduced to deterring unlawful official conduct. U.S. CONST.amend. IV
(establishing right of people to be secure in their persons against unreasonable seizures); see
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-21 (1984) (establishing good-faith exception to exclusionary rule and holding that the rule's purpose is to deter unlawful official conduct).
107. See supra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
109. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). See supra notes 42-49, infra 116-26, and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 50-54, 82, and accompanying text.
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fusion jurisdictional decisions are largely consistent with the nation-state paradigm. The Alvarez-Machain decision is destructive specifically because it
broke with paradigm-consistent precedent, by distinguishing violations of extradition treaty obligations (a legitimate reason for domestic courts t o deny
personal jurisdiction) from violations of customary international jurisdiction
law (not providing a legally sufficient basis for such a denial).
Although United States courts have often upheld jurisdiction over defendants who have been kidnapped from foreign countries,111 they have
done so in accordance with accepted notions of international law.lf2 Most
commonly, they have done so when foreign states have not objected to the
111. See generally Richard P . Shafer, Annotation, District Court Jurisdiction over Criminal
Suspect Who Was Abducted in Foreign Country and Returned to United States for Trial or Sentencing, 64 A.L.R. FED. 292 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (collecting and analyzing federal cases ruling
on federal courts' personal jurisdiction over defendants abducted from foreign countries); Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Jurisdiction of Federal Court To Try Criminal Defendant
Who Alleges that He Was Brought Within United States Jurisdiction Illegally or as Result of Fraud
or Mistake, 28 A.L.R. FED.685 (1976 & Supp. 1994) (collecting and analyzing cases involving
federal jurisdiction over criminal defendants brought into territorial jurisdiction by illegal or
irregular means).
112. Prior t o Alvarez-Machain, an important Department of Justice opinion concluded that
of all the reported decisions of United States courts addressing an alleged violation of territorial
sovereignty by international abduction, there was apparently no reported case in which a court
found jurisdiction when the abduction was the subject of a formal diplomatic protest by the
asylum state. United States Department of Justice, Extraterritorial Apprehension by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 4B Op. Off. Legal Counsel 543 (1980). Only two cases could be
found by this author in which the United States courts accepted jurisdiction over an abducted
defendant despite a state protest. However, in these cases, acceptance of jurisdiction was arguably consistent with international law, see infia note 115, because the United States itself had not
encroached on the foreign State's territorial sovereignty. In Exparte Lopez, 6 F. Supp. 342 (S.D.
Tex. 1934), while the court is less than clear about why it accepted jurisdiction "under such
circumstances," despite a state protest, the court made no mention of United States involvement
in the abduction and in fact specified that a Mexican Army captain had so been involved. Lopez,
6 F. Supp. at 344. In Jaffe v. Smith, 825 F.2d 304 (11th Cir. 1987), employees of a private Florida
bonding company had on their own initiative abducted the defendant and, in fact, following
Canada's protest the executive branch made great efforts to seek Jaffe's repatriation to Canada.
Jaffe, 825 F.2d at 307.
Reported decisions of United States courts addressing international abductions are otherwise overwhelmingly decided consistently with the international law of jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Dominguez v. State, 234 S.W. 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (precluding jurisdiction based on
reasoning that entry into Mexico by United States soldiers for purpose of apprehending criminal
offenders was "a violation of Mexican territory contrary to the law of nations in the absence of
consent of the Mexican government"); cf Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 259 (7th
Cir.) (holding that individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties
in absence of protest by sovereign involved), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v.
Reed, 639 F.2d 896,902 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that defendant had no standing to raise violation
of international law as issue absent foreign sovereign nation's objection); United States ex rel.
Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-68 (2d Cir.) (upholding district court's jurisdiction where defendant failed to allege that foreign nations objected t o abduction), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C.) (holding that only sovereign nations
and not individuals have authority to complain about violations of extradition treaties.), rev'd on
other grounds, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310, 311-13
(N.D. Ill. 1934) (finding jurisdiction over defendant where foreign country had not objected).
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abduction.l13 As I have shown, international law allows such an exercise of
jurisdiction based on the theory that, if a nation-state does not object to an
encroachment of its territorial sovereignty, it is deemed to have consented
implicitly to that encroachment.l14 In addition, courts have upheld jurisdicCases involving the seizure of vessels in foreign territorial waters involve some of the same
issues of violation of the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state. Although the jurisdictional
implications of the maritime cases are compounded by the complexities of vessel ownership, the
extent of territorial waters, and the laws of war, the cases generally support an analogous rule
that international law is not violated unless the foreign state objects to the seizure. See, e.g., The
Purissima Conception, 165 Eng. Rep. 844, 845 (1805) (Sir William Scott) ("The privilege of
territory will not itself enure to the protection of property, unless the state from which that
protection is due, steps forward to assert the right."); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 121-22
(1932); Hudson v. Guester, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281,284-85 (1810); see also Edwin D. Dickinson,
Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International Law, 28 AM.J . INT'LL. 231
(1934) (summarizing additional maritime cases in support of doctrine); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 BRITY.B. INT'LL. 265 (1952)
(same).
113. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for discussion of requirement that, under
international jurisdictional law, when a state protests an abduction from its territory, the abducting state is required t o return the defendant.
114. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. While the doctrine of male captus bene
detentus is often used as authority to support the legality of assertions of jurisdiction-by courts
over kidnapped defendants, the exception which disallows jurisdiction if the offended state objects is what is most important. It is important to point out that some commentators have cited
this doctrine for the erroneous proposition that courts have jurisdiction over defendants under
international law regardless of the circumstances surrounding their capture. E.g., Halberstam,
supra note 61, at 737-38 (noting that "person improperly seized may nevertheless properly be
brought to trial"); Bifani, supra note 61, at 676 (noting that notwithstanding illegal apprehension, state can retain jurisdiction); Campbell, supra note 61, at 410 (noting that "illegal apprehension does not preclude jurisdiction"); McCarthy, supra note 61, at 1071-72 (noting that
forcible abduction, standing alone, will not defeat jurisdiction).
The exception which disallows jurisdiction if the offended state objects is central to this
doctrine and should not be read out of it. Based on the theory that the territorial interest being
compromised is that of the state, not the defendant, only an objection by the state should invalidate jurisdiction. Reported decisions indicate that often the foreign state does not object.
Therefore, jurisdiction is allowed since the state of asylum participated, acknowledged, or acquiesced in the arrest. E.g., Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1886) (Peru did not object t o
proceeding; private detective did not conform to extradition treaty requirements); The Merino,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 391, 402-03 (1824) (American-owned vessels seized in Spanish territory of
Pensacola while Pensacola was in possession of the American army; Spain did not object); The
Ship Richmond, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102, 104 (1815) (finding seizure of American vessel within
territorial jurisdiction of foreign power offence against that power; no objection made by Spain);
Matta-Ballesteros v. Henman, 896 F.2d 255, 260 (7th Cir.) (no violation because Honduran government did not protest abduction), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990); United States v. Toro, 840
F.2d 1221, 1235 (5th Cir. 1988) (no violation despite defendant's removal from Panama by DEA
agents acting without compliance to extradition procedures because no State objection); United
States v. Zabaneh, 837 F.2d 1249, 1261 (5th Cir. 1988) (no protest by Guatemala or Belize to
defendant's removal); United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 375 (2d Cir. 1983) (no United
States officer or agent ever entered Italian territory; Italy never asserted any violation of its
rights of sovereignty); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981) (no violation
where Bahamian government did not protest defendant's abduction); United States v. Marzano,
537 F.2d 257, 270 (7th Cir. 1976) (despite FBI's involvement, including meetings with foreign
police officers and paying defendant's airfare, court found foreign official action "totally volun-
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tion when the kidnapping was not authorized by the United States government based on the traditional understanding in international law that only a
nation-state can violate international law.l15
Ironically, despite its fundamental departure from precedent, the Alvarez-Machain Court implicitly justified its reliance on the United States-Mexican bilateral extradition treaty, and not on international jurisdictional law, by
deferring to the precedent established in Ker v. Illinois,l16 the classic 1886
tary"; no illegal seizure), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68,
70-71 (2d Cir.) (holding that in absence of direct evidence of any misconduct or awareness on
part of United States Government or its representatives, court's power to adjudicate not impaired by forcible abduction following torture by Chilean police), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847
(1975); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 68 (2d Cir.) (holding that, absent
allegations of torture or brutality, abduction alone insufficient to divest court of jurisdiction; no
violation of international law since foreign state had not protested), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001
(1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974) (escaped United States convict forcibly deported to federal authorities by Peru officials; extradition treaty not invoked);
United States ex rel. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir.) (defendants delivered by Vietnamese to United States officials in Hawaii; no extradition treaty between two countries), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973); Charron v. United States, 412 F.2d 657, 659-60 (9th Cir.
1969) (defendant placed on flight to Canada by Mexican officials which stopped at Detroit; arrested during alleged specially arranged health inspection when forced to alight); Chandler v.
United States, 171 F.2d 921, 934-35 (1st Cir. 1948) (defendant seized on charges of treason by
United States military forces in Germany in 1946; no effective intrusion of any state's sovereignty because Germany's independent status was suspended), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949);
United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.D.C.) (no evidence that Lebanon or Cyprus
objected or protested circumstances of defendant's arrest), rev'd o n other grounds, 859 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Insull, 8 F. Supp. 310, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1934) (defendant forcibly
taken by Turkish police on Greek vessel and delivered to United States agent; no objections
from Hellenic Republic or Turkey); State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118, 122 (1835) (Presumed Canada
assented to forcible removal of defendant; "If they waive the invasion of their sovereignty, it is
not for the respondent to object, inasmuch, as for this offence, he is, by the law of nations,
amenable to our laws. . . . were this an attempt to subject the prisoner to the exercise of our
jurisdiction, in a case not confessedly within it, the case would be different.").
115. In some instances, no violation of international law occurred because individuals were
kidnapped in other countries by private persons or otherwise brought within the jurisdiction
without the connivance of state authorities. See supra note 112 (discussing jurisdiction in Lopez
and Jafie as arguably legal under international law because, despite foreign protest, there was no
state participation in abduction). See also Stevenson v. United States, 381 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir.
1967) (removal of defendants from Mexico not initiated by United States as defendants had
been deported by Mexican immigration authorities as undesirable aliens); United States v.
Sobell, 244 F.2d 520, 524-25 (2d Cir.), (international jurisdictional law not violated where Mexican Security Police brought United States citizen charged with espionage to United States, and
Mexico did not protest), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957). For cases applying an analogous rule
for abductions between states within the United States, see Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 706
(1888) (jurisdiction not precluded because "process emanating from the Governor of Kentucky
furnished no ground for charging any complicity on the part of that State in the wrong done to
the State of West Virginia"); State v. Ross, 21 Iowa 467, 471 (1866) (parties acting without authority in Missouri, brought to Iowa and re-arrested; court held "the State is guilty of no
wrong . . . . The officers of the law take the requisite process, find the persons charged within the
jurisdiction, and this, too, without force, wrong, fraud or violence on the part of any agent of the
State or officer thereof.").
116. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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overseas abduction case. The Alvarez-Machain Court asserted that "[ilf we
conclude that the [extradition] Treaty does not prohibit respondent's abduction, the rule in Ker applies, and the Court need not inquire as to how respondent came before it."l17 In other words, as long as the abduction
violates only general international jurisdictional law, and not an extradition
treaty, the domestic "rule in Ker" departs from international law and provides that the United States may exercise jurisdiction over an abducted defendant. Ker, however, never held that the United States could assert
jurisdiction over a defendant where the United States violated international
jurisdictional law.
While the Supreme Court in Ker found that the United States had jurisdiction over a defendant who was kidnapped from Peru and forcibly brought
to the United States, in that case the United States did not violate international law. As the Alvarez-Machain Court explained, "Ker was decided on
the premise that there was no governmental involvement in the abduction . . .
and Peru . . . did not object to [Ker's] p r o s e ~ u t i o n . "In
~ ~Ker,
~ the Court held
that the extradition treaty "was not called into operation" because the
United States sent the defendant's abductor to Peru in order to seek the defendant's legal extradition and the abductor himself made the decision to
disregard the treaty processes and abduct the defendant forcibly to the
United States.l19 The United States was, therefore, not itself involved in the
illegality of the abduction.120 In addition, as the Alvarez-Machain Court's
second reference implies and the Ker Court addressed indirectly,121 the fact
that Peru never protested the defendant's abduction or demanded his returnlZ2 is understood by international law to signify Peru's consent to the
abduction and, therefore, renders the abduction legal under international
1aw.123
While the Ker decision, based on the prevailing view at the time that
state interpretations of customary international law should not be reviewed
by the Supreme
only specifically addressed the fact that the extradition treaty had not been called into operation, it did not find that it was
upholding jurisdiction in spite of a violation of international jurisdictional
law. In fact, for the same reasons that the court found that the extradition
treaty was not called into operation, general principles of international law
were also not violated. Thus, the Court's decision to recognize jurisdiction
did not indicate the Court's willingness to disregard the general principles of
international jurisdictional law. Based upon the theory that only a nation117. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (1992).
118. Id. (citations omitted).

119. Ker, 119 U.S.

at 443.

120. Id.
121. Id. at 444.
122. Id.
123. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2180, 2193 (1992). See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
124. See supra note 82.
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state can violate international law, the failure of the United States to authorize the abduction not only meant that the illegality of the abduction as
outside the "operation" of the treaty could not be imputed to the United
States, but it also, under the same theory, meant that the abductor's violation
of general principles of international jurisdictional law could not be imputed
to the United States. In addition, Peru's failure to protest the abduction constructively authorized American jurisdiction because international law inferred Peru's retroactive consent to waive the territorial rights granted by the
general principles of international law, and not by the extradition treaty.lZ
Consequently, the Ker Court's decision to allow for jurisdiction in the absence of Peru's protest cannot be construed to imply that, even though the
extradition treaty between the United States and Peru did not ban abductions, the Court would have recognized the United State's jurisdiction in the
event that Peru ~ r 0 t e s t e d . l ~ ~
It is possible that the Alvarez-Machain Court's interpretation of Frisbie
v. C ~ l l i n s l ~ ~ - t hother
e
major abduction case relied on by the Courthelped to form the Court's incorrect interpretation of the "rule in Ker."128
Lower courts and commentators had read F r i ~ b i e previously,
l~~
in conjunction with Ker, to create the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. This doctrine states that an
American court will have valid jurisdiction over a criminal defendant regardless of how the defendant came before the court.130 The Ker-Frisbie doctrine
125. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
126. Despite the fact that Ker never actually made this distinction between general principles of international law and extradition treaties, the entire argument justifying the holding in
Alvarez-Machain depends on the assumption that it did. The Court concludes that "the only
differences" between Ker and Alvarez-Machain was that Ker was decided on the premises, discussed in the body of this article, that first there was a lack of involvement by the United States
in the abduction, and second that Peru did not protest the abduction. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S.
Ct. at 2193. Specifically, while Ker's abductor acted on his own initiative, the district court in
Alvarez-Machain found that the D E A had hired bounty hunters specifically to abduct Dr. Alvarez-Machain. United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 605 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188
(1992). In addition, while Peru remained silent, Mexico vociferously protested Dr. AlvarezMachain's abduction and demanded his return. Id. at 608. Without the benefit of a similar
factual record, the Court attempted t o fit the facts in Alvarez-Machain within the Ker holding by
showing that the extradition treaty with Mexico was similarly not violated. To d o this, the Court
extended its analysis beyond the circumstances surrounding the specific abduction to an examination of whether the provisions of the extradition treaty at issue banned kidnapping in general.
The acceptance of jurisdiction over a defendant who is present in the forum as a result of a
state-sponsored abduction despite the protests of the offended state, regardless of whether the
extradition treaty specifically bans kidnapping, is clearly contrary to international jurisdictional
law. Therefore, the effort at treaty interpretation would be in vain if the Court was otherwise to
apply international jurisdictional law. The result in Alvarez-Machain is consequently dependent
upon the proposition that violations of extradition treaties defeat jurisdiction while violations of
general principles of international law do not.
127. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
128. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
129. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Frisbie.
130. See generally Scott, supra note 36, at 95-99 (examining Ker-Frisbie doctrine and critiquing Frisbie decision).
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has primarily been used to allow jurisdiction despite illegal arrests131 or
kidnappings between states within the United States.132 This doctrine cannot
be extended to hold that jurisdiction over a defendant illegally abducted from
abroad will be recognized despite the objection of a foreign state. In addition, the doctrine certainly does not distinguish between a treaty violation
and a violation of general principles of international law as a reason for denying jurisdiction. Because Frisbie involved the abduction of a defendant from
one state within the United States to another, the most that reasonably can
be extrapolated from the case is that jurisdictional rules based on the fifty
states' sovereignty, which are analogous -to international jurisdictional rules,
are no longer applicable within the relatively integrated domestic fifty states
o f the Union.133 Therefore, neither Ker, read alone nor in conjunction with
Frisbie, can reasonably be understood to mean that American courts have
jurisdiction over a defendant illegally abducted from a foreign country despite its protest.
The Alvarez-Machain Court also heavily relied on United States v. Rau~ c h e r , decided
l~~
the same day as Ker, for the proposition that it could not
recognize jurisdiction if the extradition treaty had been vi01ated.l~~
In Rauscher, the Court held that the American forum does not have jurisdiction to
try a defendant on charges other than those for which he had been extradited
under a bilateral extradition treaty.136 The Alvarez-Machain Court interpreted this rule, known as the doctrine of "specialty," as supporting the proposition that when a bilateral extradition treaty exists, the terms of the treaty
limit the extent of criminal jurisdiction over offshore defendants.137 The
Rauscher decision buttressed the Alvarez-Machain Court's interpretation of
Ker, that extradition treaty violations can prohibit the acceptance of jurisdiction by courts over abductees while general international jurisdictional law
131. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 103940 (1984) (illegal arrest case relying on Ker-Frisbie doctrine); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S.
463, 474 (1980) (same); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 577 (1979) (same); Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (same); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-20 (1975) (same).
132. See generally Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Arrest and Transportation of Fugitive Without Extradition Proceedings as Violation of Civil Rights Actionable Under 42 U.S.C.S.
0 1983, 45 A.L.R. FED.871, 878-79 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (examining wrongful extradition by
abduction from one state to another); John E. Theuman, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule
Relating to Jurisdiction of State Court To Try Criminal Defendant Brought Within Jurisdiction
Illegally or as Result of Fraud or Mistake, 25 A.L.R. 4th 157, 162-72 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (jurisdiction to try accused not affected when accused kidnapped and forced into state's jurisdiction
from another state); T.C. Williams, Annotation, Right to Try One Brought Within Jurisdiction
Illegally or as a Result of a Mistake as to Identity, 165 A.L.R. 947, 958-60 (1946) (right to try
accused not impaired when accused kidnapped and forced from one state into jurisdiction of
another).
133. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134. 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
135. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2191 (1992).
136. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 430, 433.
137. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2191.
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~ a n n 0 t . lIn
~~
Rauscher, however, where no abduction had taken place and
there was no violation of international jurisdictional law, the Court, like the
Ker Court, never held that courts could assert jurisdiction despite a violation
of international jurisdictional law.

In this article, I have pointed out why the paradigm underlying the nation-state system requires that each individual nation-state apply the international law of jurisdiction in adjudicating issues of jurisdiction over foreign
abductees. I have refrained from making any significant normative assertions. Now, however, I will make a few conclusory normative observations.
The nation-state paradigm I have described, interconnected as it is with
the notion of territorial sovereignty, has been less than an ideal way to organize international social life. The system has led to recurrent and increasingly
deadly wars, has been used to justify horrendous violations of human rights,
and has encouraged states to sacrifice socially beneficial regulatory standards
in their competition to attract scarce capital resources. Indeed, we have entered into a very hopeful historical period where the international community is reassessing many of the basic tenets of territorial sovereignty.
The paradigm does, however, provide a coherent approach to allocating,
on an international level, the authority to enforce criminal laws. With criminal enterprises, such as those trafficking in illegal drugs, being driven by the
same globalizing forces as legitimate commerce, the maintenance of such an
approach is increasingly important.
I do not assert that the present allocation of jurisdictional responsibility
could not be improved. Various schemes could provide for nation-states to
share with international or foreign authorities their right to enforce laws
within their own territories. For example, partially in response to the inability of certain nations to effectively enforce drug laws, the International Law
Commission has recently completed preparation of a proposed statute to establish an international court. This court, in addition to deciding cases involving violations of fundamental human rights, would be charged with
hearing drug cases. Many, including some within the D E A , would be supportive of such schemes based on their belief that certain countries, such as
Mexico, are not adequately deterring criminal activities that affect countries
beyond their own borders. Indeed, in a different context, while they d o not
provide for direct enforcement of laws by foreign parties, the environmental
and labor "Side Agreements" to the recently enacted North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are devices to internationalize the enforcement
of labor and environmental laws among the United States, Canada, and
Mexico.
While a discussion of the relative merits of these kinds of proposals is
beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy for our purposes that these
--

138. Id. at 2195-96.
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proposals all emanate from a similar attempt to create a constructive and
coherent alternative to the current international allocation of jurisdictional
responsibilities. All are consistent with the paradigm supporting the international law of jurisdiction in that they only allow for the exercise of police
powers in a particular country with the consent of that country.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Alvarez-Machain. The Court, in its disregard for the
international law of jurisdiction, confused the recognized international jurisdictional paradigm. In so doing, the Court failed to provide any semblance of
a normative alternative. The Supreme Court's decision suggests jurisdictional nihilism. If used by other nation-states to legitimize engagement in
overseas abductions and then applied by other judiciaries to permit jurisdiction over abductees, the decision can only lead to global regulatory
confusion.

